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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-4-103(2)G) of the Utah 
Code and this court's January 25, 2016 order. 
Introduction 
The district court dismissed Build Inc.' s claim for additional compensation 
from UDOT for work Build performed on what the parties call the Arcadia 
project. The claim for additional compensation hinges upon whether the UDOT 
engineer believed he was ordering Build to perform work beyond what the 
contract called for when he ordered Build to haul excavated material off site. 
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment on this claim before Judge 
Kennedy, which Judge Kennedy denied when he recognized that there is 
disputed evidence concerning whether the UDOT engineer believed he was 
ordering extra work. After Judge Harris inherited the case, and well after the 
dispositive motion deadline had passed, UDOT filed a motion styled as a motion 
for clarification, but that in substance was a renewed motion for summary 
judgment. Judge Harris granted the motion, even though the same evidence 
revealed the same disputed issue of material fact. 
UDOT also filed a motion to exclude certain evidence of Build' s 
consequential damages that it incurred as a result of the breach of contract. Judge 
Harris excluded from trial the testimony of two witnesses about lost profits. But 
Judge Harris then dismissed Build's claim for consequential damages, even 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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though there is other evidence of consequential damages in the record and no 
motion to dismiss that claim was before the court. Under these circumstances, if 
the dismissal of a claim- instead of the exclusion of evidence to support a 
claim-is appropriate, then there must be a timely motion for summary 
judgment or a motion for directed verdict before the court. Here, UDOT did not 
file a dispositive motion on consequential damages, so the court lacked authority 
to dismiss the claim after excluding certain evidence. In fact, this court recently 
disapproved of this precise practice. Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 UT App 270, ,r 14 
n.11, 263 P.3d 440. 
This court should reverse the district court's order dismissing Build' s 
claims for additional compensation stemming from the Arcadia project and 
Build' s claim for consequential damages. 
2 
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether under the coordinate judge rule a second judge can 
reverse the first judge's denial of a dispositive motion and dismiss a party's 
claims, where the motions before the second judge were not motions to 
reconsider and were filed well after the dispositive motion deadline. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 13721. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews for correctness a district court 
judge's decision to overrule a prior judge's denial of summary judgment. AMS 
Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997). 
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in dismissing a claim for 
consequential damages where no dispositive motion was before the court and 
there was some evidence of consequential damages in the record. 
Preservation: The evidence of consequential damages was preserved at 
R. 7173, and the dismissal issue arose for the first time at R. 15782-83. 
Standard of Review: An appellate court reviews for correctness a district 
court's decision to enter summary judgment. Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, 
,r 10, 221 P.3d 219. 
Determinative Provisions 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal. 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case arises out of Build' s work on three different UDOT construction 
projects: the Legacy project, the Arcadia project, and the 1-215 project. (R. 195-
201.) Build was the general contractor on the Arcadia and I 215 projects, and it 
was a subcontractor for Clyde-Geneva Constructors on the Legacy project. 
(R. 195, 199, 200.) Build experienced problems with all three projects and filed 
claims against UDOT and Clyde-Geneva. (R. 194, 204-15.) Build claimed that 
UDOT breached its contracts and sought consequential damages. (R. 194-215.) 
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment on Build' s claims related to 
the Arcadia project, and a motion for partial summary judgment on Build' s 
consequential damages claim.1 (R. 753, 1279.) Judge Kennedy denied the motion 
on the ground that Build had provided sufficient admissible evidence to support 
both claims. (R. 9837-39.) After the dispositive motion deadline had passed and 
the case was reassigned to Judge Harris, UDOT filed a motion in limine to 
exclude certain evidence of consequential damages and a motion for clarification 
regarding Judge Kennedy's denial of summary judgment on Build's breach of 
contract claim. (R. 10323.) Judge Harris granted both motions and dismissed both 
claims. (R. 15781-85.) 
1 UDOT filed motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment 
on all of Build' s claims, but only the motions concerning the Arcadia project and 
consequential damages are relevant to this appeal. (R. 750, 1279, 1534, 1772.) 
4 
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Build filed a petition for permission to appeal from Judge Harris' s 
interlocutory order, and this court granted the petition. (12/15/15 Pet.; 1/25/16 
Order.) 
2. Statement of Facts 
This appeal concerns Build's claims (i) for consequential damages resulting 
from UDOT's failure to compensate Build in connection with all three projects, 
and (ii) for UDOT' s breach of contract on the Arcadia project. 
2.1 Build's Consequential Damages 
Build's claim for consequential damages arises out of UDOT's failure to 
compensate Build for its work on all three projects. On the I-215 project, Build 
alleged that it completed the work described in the contract, but UDOT delayed 
payment. (R. 200.) On the Legacy and Arcadia projects, Build alleged that UDOT 
asked Build to complete additional work- beyond the scope of the contracts-
and that UDOT failed to compensate Build for the additional work. (R. 197-99, 
201.) As a result of UDOT' s failures to pay Build, Build lost capital and cash flow. 
(R. 201-03, 3637.) Because Build lost capital and cash flow, Build lost its bonding 
capacity, and UDOT reduced the amount of work that Build was allowed to bid 
on. (R. 3637.) UDOT's breaches, along with Build's mounting litigation expenses 
in this case, caused Build' s eventual demise. (R. 3594, 7173, 7249, 7251-52, 7273-
74.) 
Build filed a claim against UDOT, alleging business devastation. (R. 194, 
439.) Build sought consequential damages for its lost profits. (R. 199, 201-14, 439.) 
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Build stated that its total damages were still being calculated, but would exceed 
$5 million. (R. 439, 15363.) 
In support of its consequential damages claim, Build retained Joan 
Whitacre to provide an expert opinion on the effect of UDOT' s failure to pay 
Build. (R. 3610, 10327.) Ms. Whitacre provided an analysis of Build "as an on-
going business" and concluded that Build had been financially healthy prior to 
its work with UDOT. (R. 3609-19, 10324, 10332.) She concluded that "[t]he 
tipping point that sent [Build] into an umecoverable financial situation" was 
UDOT's failure to pay. (R. 3619.) 
Build also stated in its initial disclosures that Build' s president, Freddie 
Stromness, had personal knowledge concerning the business devastation claim. 
(R. 15362.) UDOT took the deposition of Mr. Stromness in July of 2013. 
(R. 12975.) The deposition lasted two days. (R. 12975.) Mr. Stromness testified 
that Build' s business devastation claim was based upon Ms. Whitacre' s report. 
(R. 15364.) Neither UDOT nor Clyde-Geneva asked Mr. Stromness whether he 
had an opinion regarding Build' s value or Build' s lost profits. (R. 12975.) At the 
end of the two-day deposition, Clyde-Geneva asked for the opportunity to 
question Mr. Stromness. (R. 12975.) Build made the accommodation even though 
fact discovery had closed. (R. 12976.) 
Mr. Stromness's second deposition was held in August 2014-more than a 
year after his first deposition. (R. 12976.) At the beginning of the deposition, 
Build's counsel stated that, because the second deposition was a continuation of 
the first, it would be inappropriate to question Mr. Stromness about any issues 
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that had arisen after his original deposition concluded the previous year. 
(R. 12976.) Consistent with that position, Build' s counsel objected to those 
questions and instructed Mr. Strornness not to answer. (R. 12976, 16275-77.) 
2.2 UDOT's Breaches of Contract on the Arcadia Project 
Although Build suffered consequential damages from UDOT' s breaches on 
all three projects, the details of only the Arcadia project are relevant to this 
appeal. 
The Arcadia project involved the replacement of a bridge and the 
reconstruction of a highway on either side of the bridge. (R. 854.) The project 
required a significant amount of excavation. (R. 854.) The plan contemplated that 
the excavated clay would be disposed of within the limits of the Arcadia project 
boundaries as "fill." (R. 854.) The contract did not contain any line item or cost 
for disposing of excavated clay beyond the project site. (R. 855.) Instead, the plan 
provided as fallows: 
Fill slopes may be £la ttened as shown on plans in order 
to waste excess material. Fill slopes may be placed up to 
a 10:1 slope with the new toe of slope at least 10 feet 
from proposed [right of way] line. 
(R. 854, 3114, 3117, attached at Add. C.) The contract also detailed how much fill 
could be stored at particular locations within the project site. (R. 1331, attached at 
Add. D.) 
But as Build began the excavation, UDOT's resident engineer, Rex 
Harrison, learned of "subsurface movement" -a landslide-in the area where 
the material was to be placed. (R. 3503, 3511-12, attached at Add. E.) UDOT 
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completed a change order indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an 
unstable historic land slide" and detailing the "corrective action" taken to 
"improve its stability per Geotechnical Engineers['] recommendations." (R. 7743, 
attached at Add. F.) 
Mr. Harrison determined that there was not enough room for the 
excavated material to be disposed of on the fill slopes. (R. 856, 3511-12.) 
Mr. Harrison instructed Build to haul the clay offsite. (R. 201, 3511-12.) Build 
followed Mr. Harrison's instructions, but the additional work resulted in 
additional costs of $389,000. (R. 201, 857, 859.) 
Build sought compensation from UDOT for the additional work. (R. 201.) 
UDOT denied Build' s request, and Build alleged that UDOT' s denial constituted 
a breach of contract. (R. 209-10, 858, 3530.) 
Two provisions of the contract are relevant to Build' s claim. Both 
provisions govern situations where UDOT requires Build to complete additional 
work. The difference between the provisions is whether it is UDOT or instead 
Build who first recognizes that the work is beyond the scope of the contract. 
The first, part 1.6, applies if UDOT intentionally changes the project. 
(R. 2428, attached at Add. B.) It is titled "Significant Changes in the Character of 
Work." (R. 2428.) Part 1.6 allows UDOT to order Build to complete additional 
work, but it requires UDOT to notify Build of the additional work in writing. 
(R. 2428.) 
The second provision, part 1.5, applies if UDOT orders work that Build 
believes is beyond the scope of the contract, something the contract refers to as 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an "alleged change[]." (R. 2427.) Part 1.5 is titled "Differing Site Conditions, 
Changes and Extra Work." (R. 2427.) It requires that, if Build believes UDOT has 
ordered additional work, Build will "[p ]romptly notify the [ e ]ngineer in writing 
of alleged changes to the [c]ontract ... within five calendar days of the date the 
change or action was noted." (R. 2427.) 
Notably, Mr. Harrison testified that Build followed the correct procedure 
in attempting to obtain additional compensation for its additional work. (R. 3509-
10.) 
2.3 Judge Kennedy Denies UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment 
After discovery closed, UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment on 
Build's breach of contract claim concerning the Arcadia project. (R. 1279.) UDOT 
argued that hauling the excavated clay offsite was not additional work because 
the contract contemplated that the excavated clay would not be placed on the 
project site. (R. 1285, 1296-97.) UDOT also argued that Build's claim was barred 
because Build failed to provide written notice of the "alleged change" as 
~ required by part 1.5 of the contract. (R. 1293.) UDOT argued that it denied 
Build's claim because Mr. Harrison "felt there was no validity to Build's claim" 
because the contract "specifically states" that Build will dispose of excess 
material. (R. 7707.) 
In support, UDOT presented evidence that a Build representative testified 
that he knew Build would be required to haul the excess clay off site. (R. 1287, 
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1289.) UDOT also presented evidence that "Build felt it was Build's responsibility 
to haul the material" and that Build waited more than a year to provide written 
notice of its claim. (R. 1289.) 
In opposing the motion, Build argued that, because Rex Harrison had 
notice of the additional work, UDOT waived the notice provision under part 1.5 
of the contract. (R. 3465-66.) Build also argued that, because Mr. Harrison did not 
order the work "in writing" as required by part 1.6 of the contract, UDOT 
breached the contract. (R. 3470.) 
In support, Build presented evidence that the contract required the 
excavated clay to be disposed of within the project boundaries, and that 
Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering additional work. (R. 3456-57.) 
Specifically, Build presented evidence that Mr. Harrison testified that he 
"exercise[ d] engineering judgment" when he decided to order Build to haul the 
excess clay offsite. (R. 3456, 2812-13.) Thus, hauling the clay off site was a result of 
Mr. Harrison's judgment, not the contract. (R. 3463.) Build also presented 
evidence that Mr. Harrison later acknowledged, in writing, that a "change• ... 
[w]as the basis of [Build's] claim in that [excavated material] could no longer be 
effectively disposed of within the contract limits." (R. 3456-57, 3530, attached at 
Add. G.) 
Judge Kennedy denied UDOT's motion. (R. 9837.) Judge Kennedy ruled 
that Build's claims "are subject to questions of fact, including whether UDOT 
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breached its contract with [Build], whether UDOT waived the notice provision 
and whether [Build' s] claims satisfy the requirements of the Changed Conditions 
Clause of the contract specifications." (R. 9837.) 
2.4 The Case is Assigned to Judge Harris After the Dispositive Motion 
Deadline Passes 
Judge Kennedy retired shortly after he denied UDOT' s motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 10158.) After his retirement, the case was assigned to 
Judge Harris. (Docket at 2/13/15.) The deadline for dispositive motions passed 
on January 31, 2014-more than a year before Judge Harris was assigned to the 
case. (R. 270.) 
2.5 Judge Harris Overhtrns Judge Kennedy's Summary Judgment 
Ruling 
On July 23, 2015, UDOT filed a motion seeking to reverse Judge Kennedy's 
summary judgment ruling. (R. 11622-38.) UDOT captioned its motion as a 
"Motion for Clarification on Legal Issues Not Yet Addressed or Ruled Upon." 
(R. 11622.) UDOT filed a similar motion addressing Judge Kennedy's ruling on 
~ Build's claims concerning the Legacy project. (R. 10157.) 
In the motion, UDOT claimed that Judge Kennedy's ruling "d[id] not 
address or rule upon" Build's claims concerning Arcadia and "d[id] not identify 
with any specificity the material facts Judge Kennedy ruled were at issue." 
(R. 11623.) UDOT's motion purported to seek "clarification," not dismissal of 
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Build's claims. (R. 11622, 11637.) UDOT asserted that its motion was neither a 
motion for summary judgment nor a motion to reconsider. (R. 14666, 14670.) 
UDOT repeated the arguments it had made in its summary judgment 
motion before Judge Kennedy. UDOT argued that hauling the excavated clay 
offsite was not additional work because the contract contemplated that the 
excavated clay would not be placed on the project site. (R. 11626-28.) UDOT also 
argued that Build's claim was barred because Build failed to provide UDOT 
written notice of the "alleged change" as required by part 1.5 of the contract. 
(R. 11628-34.) UDOT noted that "[t]he proper analysis in this case ... is to 
examine whether Rex Harrison believed the alleged extra work actually 
constituted extra work under the contract." (R. 14674.) 
UDOT cited additional evidence -not cited in its summary judgment 
motion-that Mr. Harrison believed his orders were consistent with the contract. 
(R. 11627-28.) Specifically, UDOT pointed to Mr. Harrison's testimony that he 
"did not consider Build's hauling of the extra material ... to constitute [a] change 
involving extra work" and that "[t]he intent was not to dispose of all the excess 
materials within the limits of the project boundaries." (R. 11627.) 
Build argued that Judge Harris should deny UDOT' s motion because 
Judge Kennedy had already ruled upon UDOT's arguments. (R. 13695, 13721.) 
Build argued that, in effect, UDOT' s motion was a motion for summary 
judgment filed well after the dispositive motion deadline. (R. 13721-22.) 
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Build again pointed to the evidence that the contract required the 
excavated clay to be disposed of within the project boundaries, that Mr. Harrison 
testified that he used his "engineering judgment" when he ordered Build to haul 
it offsite, and that Mr. Harrison later acknowledged, in writing, that a "change[] 
... [w]as the basis of [Build's] claim in that [excavated material] could no longer 
be effectively disposed of within the contract limits." (R. 13713, 13716, 13718.) 
Build also cited evidence-not cited in its summary judgment motion-that 
Mr. Harrison testified that "the contractor was allowed to dispose of excavated 
material in waste areas" within the project site. (R. 13714 (citing R. 3504).) 
Judge Harris dismissed Build' s claim. (R. 15784-85.) Judge Harris ruled 
that under section 1.5 of the contract, Build was required to provide notice of an 
"alleged change" if Mr. Harrison did not believe he had ordered additional 
work (R. 15784-85 (citing Meadow Valley Contractors v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35,266 
P.3d 671).) 
Judge Harris concluded that "[h]ere, UDOT provides evidence indicating 
that Rex Harrison, the resident engineer, did not believe that the direction to 
Build to haul waste material offsite was a change to Build's scope of work Build 
has provided no evidence to the contrary." (R. 15785.) Of course, Build had 
provided evidence to the contrary, just as it had in opposing the original motion 
for summary judgment. 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In response to UDOT's other "motion for clarification" - addressing Judge 
Kennedy's rulings on the Legacy project-Judge Harris explained that the court 
"takes [it] as a motion to reconsider," and "conclude[ed] that reconsideration of 
its prior order is necessary." (R. 15778.) Judge Harris made no similar comments 
in his discussion of Build's "motion for clarification" on Build's claims 
concerning the Arcadia project. (R. 15784-85.) 
2.6 Judge Harris Dismisses Build's Consequential Damages Claim 
UDOT also filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Ms. Whitacre and 
Mr. Stromness. (R. 10323.) UDOT argued that neither witness should be allowed 
to testify about Build' s value or its lost profits. (R. 10334.) UDOT argued that 
Ms. Whitacre should not be allowed to testify because she did not opine about 
the amount of Build' s damages in her expert report as required under rule 
26(a)(3). (R. 10341.) And UDOT argued that Mr. Stromness should not be allowed 
to testify about the amount of damages because Build failed to provide a 
calculation of its business devastation damages as required under rule 26(a)(l). 
(R. 10337-38.) UDOT asked that the testimony of both witnesses be excluded as a 
sanction under rule 37. (R. 10337-38, 10341-42.) UDOT's motion sought the 
exclusion of the testimony, not the dismissal of Build' s consequential damages 
claim. (R. 10342.) 
In opposing the motion, Build argued that Mr. Stromness should be able to 
testify because Build had provided to UDOT all of the documents Build relied on 
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to support its consequential damages claim. (R. 12964.) Build also argued that 
Ms. Whitacre should be allowed to testify because her report described both the 
fact and causes of Build's damages. (R. 12968.) 
Judge Harris agreed with UDOT. He ruled that Ms. Whitacre could not 
testify as to the amount of damages because she did not quantify consequential 
damages in her report. (R. 15781.) He ruled that Mr. Stromness could not testify 
as a sanction under rule 37(£) both because Build had failed to provide a 
computation of its consequential damages in violation of rule 26(a)(l)(c) and 
because Build had instructed Mr. Strornness not to answer questions about 
Build's consequential damages at his second deposition in violation of rule 
30(c)(2). (R. 15782.) 
The court then dismissed Build' s consequential damages claim. (R.15782-
83.) The court ruled that because Mr. Stromness was Build' s sole witness on its 
consequential damages claim, and Mr. Stromness's testimony was now excluded, 
Build' s consequential damages claim "fails for lack of proof." (R. 15782.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
Judge Harris dismissed Build' s contract claims concerning the Arcadia 
project and Build' s claim for consequential damages even though UDOT did not 
file a dispositive motion and even though Judge Kennedy had previously denied 
UDOT' s dispositive motions directed at those claims. UDOT instead filed a 
motion for clarification and motion in limine. UDOT did not cite Rule 56 or 
otherwise comply with the requirements for moving for summary judgment. 
UDOT repeatedly insisted that it was not asking Judge Harris to reconsider 
Judge Kennedy's prior ruling. In this procedural posture, Judge Harris erred in 
dismissing Build' s claims. 
Judge Harris also erred because the same disputed issues of material fact 
identified by Judge Kennedy remained when Judge Harris dismissed the claims. 
Build' s claims concerning the Arcidia project hinge upon whether the UDOT 
engineer believed he was ordering Build to perform work outside the contract. 
Build provided evidence that the UDOT engineer had that belief, making 
summary judgment inappropriate on those claims. And Build' s claim for 
consequential damages should not have been dismissed because there remained 
a category of consequential damages - attorney fees- in play, and because Build 
must put on its case at trial, after which dismissal may be appropriate only if 
Build provides no evidence of consequential damages. This court should reverse 
the dismissal of both claims so Build can present its case at trial. 
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Argument 
Judge Harris erred, both procedurally and substantively, when he 
dismissed Build' s claims for breach of contract and consequential damages. 
1. Judge Harris Erred When He Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of 
UDOT and, in Effect, Reversed Judge Kennedy's Ruling 
Judge Harris erred in three ways when he entered summary judgment in 
favor of UDOT on Build' s breach of contract claim concerrung the Arcadia 
project-two procedural and one substantive. First, he granted what was in 
essence a summary judgment motion filed beyond the dispositive motions 
deadline, a motion Judge Kennedy already had denied. Second, he violated the 
coordinate judge rule when he reversed Judge Kennedy's ruling. Third, he either 
ignored or gave little weight to Build' s evidence- evidence that, properly 
considered, created a disputed issue of fact, just as Judge Kennedy recognized. 
But before explaining how Judge Harris erred, it is important to 
understand the extent to which Judge Harris' s ruling reversed Judge Kennedy's 
prior ruling. Comparing the arguments UDOT made in its initial motion for 
summary judgment with the arguments UDOT made in its subsequent "motion 
for clarification" and the rulings in the orders resolving those arguments 
confirms that Judge Harris ruled upon - and reversed - issues previously ruled 
upon by Judge Kennedy. 
Before Judge Kennedy, the relevant questions were (i) whether hauling the 
excavated clay was additional work beyond the scope of the contract, and (ii) if it 
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was additional work, whether Build' s claim was nonetheless barred because 
Build failed to provide notice of the alleged change. (R. 1285, 1293, 1296-97.) 
The parties presented conflicting evidence. Build presented evidence that 
(i) the contract required the excavated clay to be disposed of within the project 
boundaries, and (ii) Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering additional 
work. (R. 3456-57.) UDOT presented evidence that (i) the work was not beyond 
the scope of the contract and (ii) Mr. Harrison agreed. (R. 7707.) 
Judge Kennedy ruled that there were disputed issues of material fact 
concerning (i) whether the work was beyond the scope of the contract and 
(ii) whether the notice provision applied-Le., whether Mr. Harrison knew that 
he was ordering additional work. (R. 9837.) 
Before Judge Harris, the issue presented was whether Build' s claim was 
barred because Build failed to provide notice of the alleged change. (R. 11630-34.) 
That issue turned upon whether Build had an obligation to provide notice, which 
in turn turned upon whether UDOT understood that it was ordering additional 
work. As UDOT put it, "[t]he proper analysis in this case ... is to examine 
whether Rex Harrison believed the alleged extra work actually constituted extra 
work under the contract." (R. 14674.) Thus, the issue presented to Judge Harris 
was the same as the issue presented to Judge Kennedy. 
The parties again presented the conflicting evidence. Build presented 
evidence that (i) the contract required the excavated clay to be disposed of within 
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the project boundaries, and (ii) Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering 
additional work. (R. 13713, 13716, 13718, 13714 (citing R.3504).) UDOT presented 
evidence that (i) the work was not beyond the scope of the cont.Tact and 
(ii) Mr. Harrison understood that and agreed. (R. 11626-28, 14674.) 
Judge Harris ruled that there was not a factual dispute and Build' s claims 
were barred because Build failed to comply with the notice provisions. 
(R. 15785.) Judge Harris ruled that "UDOT provides evidence indicating that Rex 
Harrison, the resident engineer, did not believe that the direction to Build to haul 
waste material offsite was a change to Build' s scope of work. Build has provided 
no evidence to the contrary." (R. 15785.) Of course, while UDOT did provide 
such evidence, Build had provided evidence to the contrary, just as it had in 
opposing the original motion for summary judgment. 
1.1 Judge Harris Granted an Untimely Dispositive Motion and Ruled 
Upon Issues that Judge Kennedy Had Already Decided 
UDOT captioned its motion as a "Motion for Ruling and Clarification on 
Legal Issues Not Yet Addressed or Ruled Upon." (R. 11622.) This motion could 
function either as a motion for summary judgment,2 asking the court to rule on 
UDOT's arguments in the first instance, or as a motion for reconsideration, 
asking the court to reverse Judge Kennedy's prior ruling. The substance of the 
2 Even though UDOT' s motion functioned as a motion for summary 
judgment, it did not comply with the requirements of rule 56(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This failure is another reason Judge Harris erred in granting 
the motion. 
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motion-and of Judge Harris's ruling on the motion-shows that it functions as a 
motion for summary judgment. But the motion was filed on July 23, 2015, well 
after the January 31, 2014 deadline for dispositive motions. (R. 270, 11637.) Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(b) (motion for summary judgment must be filed by deadline 
ordered by the court). Judge Harris therefore erred in considering, let alone 
granting, UDOT' s motion for summary judgment, however it was captioned.3 
The substance of UDOT' s motion reveals that it is a motion for summary 
judgment, which explains why it led to the dismissal of Build' s claim. UDOT 
asked Judge Harris to consider the waiver issue in the first instance. (R. 11630-
34.) Specifically, UDOT asked Judge Harris to decide whether Build's claims are 
barred because Build failed to give notice that it was being asked to perform 
extra work beyond what its contract required. (R. 14667.) 
UDOT asserted in its motion papers that "Judge Kennedy d[id] not 
address or rule upon" UDOT' s arguments concerning the extra work and notice 
provision. (R. 11623, 11630-34.) Indeed, UDOT cited and responded to arguments 
Build made in its opposition to UDOT' s initial summary judgment motion. 
(R. 11633-34 (citing "Build's Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment regarding Arcadia").) 
3 UDOT insisted in its reply that UDOT "is not requesting summary 
judgment." (R.14666.) But this court has held that "the substance, not caption, of 
a motion is dispositive in determining the character of the motion." Trembly v. 
Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Kunzler v. O'Dell, 
855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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Judge Harris's order confirms that he construed UDOT's motion to be a 
motion for summary judgment. He recites the arguments UDOT made in its 
initial summary judgment motion, 11 grants th[ e] motion," and II dismisse[ s ]" 
Build's claims. (R. 15784-85.) 
But while Judge Harris dismissed Build' s claim when he entered summary 
judgment, it is unclear which of UDOT' s motions he granted in entering 
summary judgment. It could have been either UDOT' s initial summary judgment 
motion that Judge Kennedy had denied or UDOT' s second "Motion for 
Clarification" filed after the dispositive motion deadline. Either way, Judge 
Harris erred. 
If Judge Harris was addressing UDOT' s first motion, he erred because that 
motion was not before him-Judge Kennedy already denied it. (R. 9837.) Judge 
Kennedy's ruling denies UDOT' s motion even if UDOT believes that Judge 
Kennedy did not address all of UDOT' s arguments. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) (a ruling on a motion "implicitly and necessarily 
constitute[s] an adverse ruling" on arguments not expressly addressed in ruling). 
If Judge Harris instead was addressing UDOT' s second motion, he erred 
because the motion was filed more than a year after the deadline for dispositive 
motions and does not comply with rules 7 and 56. (R. 270.) Thus, regardless of 
which motion Judge Harris was considering, he erred when he considered 
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UDOT' s motion to be, in substance, a dispositive motion and entered summary 
judgment against Build.4 
This court recently disapproved of precisely this practice. In Fisher v. 
Davidhizar, after the trial court had denied a motion for summary judgment on a 
fraud claim, the defendant filed a motion in limine, a motion designed to 
determine which evidence can be presented at trial. 2011 UT App 270, ,r,r 4-5, 263 
P.3d 440. But the court treated the motion in limine as a dispositive motion, 
ruling that the plaintiff "could not prevail because he could not prove his fraud 
claims by clear and convincing evidence." Id. ,r 5. 
This court faulted the district court for granting what was, in effect, an 
untimely summary judgment motion that repeated arguments on which the 
court had already ruled. This court held that, "although styled as a motion in 
limine, [the plaintiff's] last minute motion was in substance a motion to dismiss 
made long after the motion cut-off date had passed." Id. ,r 14 n.11. "It seems what 
the trial court did ... was revisit its summary judgment ruling. However, the 
trial court appears not to have relied on the facts from the summary judgment 
filings .... If the trial court was revisiting its previous denial of summary 
judgment on the fraud claims, it erred in considering contradictory evidence and 
4 In its reply, UDOT for the first time asserted that it was a "Rule 56( d) 
Motion" and cited authority. (R.14658, 14666, 14670.) But even ignoring the fact 
that UDOT' s assertion came too late, rule 56( d) solves nothing. Rule 56( d) 
allowed the court to "ascertain" and "specify[]" what material facts exist in 
adjudicating a motion for partial summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(d) 
(2011). It did not provide an alternate basis to dismiss a party's claims. 
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making a credibility determination." Id. Because the record contained disputed 
issues of material fact, this court held that the district court was correct in its 
initial decision to deny summary judgment. Id. ,r,r 15-16. 
The same is true of UDOT' s second motion. This court should reverse 
Judge Harris's ruling and reinstate Judge Kennedy's denial of summary 
judgment so Build can have the opportunity to prove its claims at trial. 
UDOT's motion was not a motion to reconsider - It is worth noting that, 
to the extent UDOT disagreed with Judge Kennedy's ruling, UDOT could-and 
should-have filed a motion to reconsider, if it could have overcome the 
coordinate judge rule. A judge remains free to reconsider his own prior decisions 
"at any time before the entry" of final judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Indeed, 
prior to the entry of final judgment, a 54(b) motion to reconsider is the 
appropriate way to request that a judge reverse his own summary judgment 
ruling. Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184-85; Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 
761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
But a judge's authority to revise his prior rulings is not without limit. 
Judges can abuse their discretion in reconsidering prior rulings. Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996). This court has held that "a litigant 
seeking revision and reversal" of a summary judgment ruling II must demonstrate 
a reason for the request." U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ,r 58, 
990 P.2d 945 (emphasis added). This court has articulated a list of such reasons: 
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(1) the matter is presented in a" different light" or under 
"different circumstances;" (2) there has been a change in 
the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; 
(4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does not 
reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct 
its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed 
when first contemplated by the court. 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Edward A. Reott, 2011 UT App 152, ,r 9, 263 P.3d 391 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The list is not exhaustive. Id. But absent one 
such factor, a court abuses its discretion when it reverses a prior summary 
judgment ruling. Id. 
Here, UDOT's motion was not styled as, nor was it in substance, a motion 
to reconsider. Indeed, UDOT insisted in its reply that "this motion is not a 
Motion for Reconsideration" and that UDOT "is not ... moving the Court to 
reconsider summary judgment." (R. 14666, 14670.) Similarly, at the hearing 
before Judge Harris, UDOT's counsel explained that "we're not asking the Court 
to overrule Judge Kennedy." (R. 16136.) 
The substance of the motion confirms UDOT' s claim. UDOT does not cite 
rule 54(b) or request that Judge Harris reverse Judge Kennedy's ruling. UDOT 
does not acknowledge-let alone identify an error-in Judge Kennedy's decision 
that there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the waiver issue. 
(R. 11630-33.) 
Similarly, Judge Harris's order confirms that he did not treat UDOT's 
motion as a motion for reconsideration. Although Judge Harris expressly stated 
that he treated UDOT's "Motion for Clarification" on the Legacy project as if it 
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were a motion to reconsider, he did not do so for UDOT' s motion for clarification 
with regard to the Arcadia project, which is at issue here. (R. 15778, 15784-85.) 
The order does not mention rule 54(b). (R. 15784-85.) The order does not 
acknowledge that Judge Kennedy denied UDOT' s motion for summary 
judgment, let alone identify an error in that ruling. (R. 15784-85.) Nor does it cite 
any factor that would provide the court an appropriate reason to reconsider 
Judge Kennedy's ruling. (R. 15784-85.) 
1.2 Judge Harris Violated the Coordinate Judge Rule 
Even if UDOT' s motion had been a motion to reconsider, Judge Harris' s 
order would still be improper because it violates the coordinate judge rule. 
Under the coordinate judge rule, "one district court judge cannot overrule 
another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 
947 (Utah 1987). The rule is a branch of the law of the case doctrine, and it has 
11 evolved to avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is 
presented with an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon by 
~ a coordinate judge in the same case." Id. at 946-47. 
Utah courts have recognized three exceptions to the rule. The first occurs 
when "relevant circumstances change in the intervening period," such as II a 
change in the governing law." State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989). 
The second exception occurs when "the issues decided by the first judge are 
presented to the second judge in a different light," such as "where a summary 
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judgment initially denied is subsequently granted after additional evidence is 
adduced." AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 
(Utah 1997). 
The third exception occurs when, "although the factual and legal posture 
of the case has not changed, it appears to the second judge that the first ruling 
was clearly erroneous and will infect the subsequent proceedings with error." 
Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, ,r 5, 996 P.2d 540. Thus, under the 
coordinate judge rule, "[i]t is not that the second judge lacks power to revisit an 
earlier judge's rulings. Rather, there are circumstances where that power should 
not be exercised."5 Id. ,r 4. 
The rule is long-standing. It has repeatedly been reaffirmed by this court 
and the supreme court, as recently as May 2016. USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 
2016 UT 20, ,r,r 37-39, _ P.3d _; Red Flame, 2000 UT 22, ,r 4; Archuleta v. 
Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ,r 34 n.3, 267 P.3d 232; AMS, 942 P.2d at 319; Lamper, 779 P.2d 
at 1129; Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 908-09 (Utah 1989); Mascaro, 
741 P.2d at 946-47; Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735,736 
(Utah 1984); Bd. of Educ. of Granite School District v. Salt Lake Cnty., 659 P.2d 1030, 
1033 (Utah 1983); Richardson v. Grand Cent. Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); 
5 Build argued that Judge Harris should deny UDOT' s motion because the 
motion violated the coordinate judge rule. (R.13721-23.) At the hearing, Judge 
Harris asked Build's counsel whether Judge Harris had discretion to consider the 
issues that Judge Kennedy had already ruled upon. (R.16135.) Consistent with 
Red Flame, Build's counsel explained that the court had discretion to consider the 
issues, but that the court "should not exercise it." (R.16135-36.) 
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Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973); Wood v. Lewis, 
No. 20060429-CA, 2006 WL 2089976, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. July 28, 2006); Jenkins v. 
Payne, No. 20000956-CA, 2002 WL 724589, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2002); 
State v. Ellis, 969 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Schoney v. Mem'l Estates, 
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 
Inc., 739 P.2d 634,636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Here, Judge Harris violated the coordinate judge rule to the extent he 
overruled Judge Kennedy's summary judgment ruling. As discussed above, the 
issue before Judge Harris was the same as the issue Judge Kennedy had already 
resolved-whether there was evidence that Mr. Harrison understood that 
ordering Build to haul the excavated material offsite constituted work beyond 
the scope of the contract. (R. 7707, 14674.) Judge Kennedy ruled that there were 
disputed issues of material fact on that issue, and Judge Harris ruled that there 
were none. (R. 9837,15785.) 
No exception to the rule applies. Below, UDOT argued that the third 
exception applied- that an error in Judge Kennedy's ruling "will infect the trial." 
(R. 14670.) Indeed, Judge Harris noted that UDOT's argument was that .(/there's 
been an error made that would infect the proceedings." (R. 16134.) But neither 
UDOT nor Judge Harris identified any error. Instead, aside from UDOT' s single 
use of the word" error," UDOT maintained its position that Judge Kennedy had 
not ruled upon the issues in UDOT's brief. (E.g., R.14666.) 
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The other two exceptions also do not apply. There has been no change in 
the law governing Build' s claims or UDOT' s defenses, nor did UDOT claim that 
there had been any. Lamper, 779 P.2d at 1129. (See R.11622-37.) And UDOT did 
not present the issue to Judge Harris in a II different light." AMS, 942 P.2d at 319. 
There was no evidence before Judge Harris that resolved the factual dispute 
identified by Judge Kennedy. (R. 9837, 15785.) Although both parties presented 
additional evidence before Judge Harris, the evidence served to reinforce-not 
resolve-the dispute. 
UDOT' s additional evidence was Mr. Harrison's testimony that he II did 
not consider Build' s hauling of the extra material ... to constitute [a] change 
involving extra work" and that 11 [t]he mtent was not to dispose of all the excess 
materials within the limits of the project boundaries." (R. 11627.) Build's 
additional evidence was Mr. Harrison's testimony that "the contractor was 
allowed to dispose of excavated material in waste areas" withm the project site. 
(R. 13714 (citing R. 3504).) Thus, the issue was presented to Judge Harris in 
precisely the same light as it had been presented to Judge Kennedy. The 
exception does not apply. Under the coordinate judge rule, Judge Harris erred 
when he reversed Judge Kennedy's ruling. 
To be clear, there have been opinions from this court and from the Utah 
Supreme Court holding that a judge has discretion to reconsider the decision of a 
coequal judge. Under these opinions, the three exceptions are turned on their 
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heads-they are no longer exceptions to the rule prohibiting reconsideration, but 
instances where the second judge must reconsider the first judge's ruling. E.g., 
Mid-Am. Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ,r,r 11-15, 216 P.3d 352; IHC 
Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,r,r 25-28, 196 P.3d 588. But 
these opinions do not render Judge Harris' s ruling proper. 
First, UDOT did not argue that these opinions overruled the coordinate 
judge rule. (R. 14670.) Indeed, in response to Build's argument that Judge Harris 
was bound by the coordinate judge rule, UDOT agreed, arguing only that its 
motion "does not violate the coordinate judges rule" because the motion "falls 
under one of the exceptions." (R. 14668 (capitalization omitted).) 
UDOT cited IHC, but only in response to Build's argument that UDOT's 
motion was untimely. (R. 14670-72.) Specifically, UDOT argued that, because 
under IHC a court may reconsider a prior decision, "a Motion for 
Reconsideration would still be timely if filed at the present time." (R. 14671-72.) 
UDOT did not argue that IHC had any bearing on the coordinate judge rule 
analysis. Thus, to the extent UDOT would now argue that the coordinate judge 
rule is inapplicable, the argument would be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Regardless, the cases do not acknowledge, let alone overrule, the line of 
cases upholding the coordinate judge rule. The coordinate judge rule remains 
good law. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the rule in May of 2016, 
noting that "the doctrine prevents the second judge from overruling the first," 
29 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unless an exception such as the II different light" exception applies. USA Power, 
2016 UT 20, ,r 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that 
"[m]ere citation of additional authority alone is insufficient to warrant revisiting 
a decided issue, at least where the cited authority does not modify the 
fundamental theory of the motion." Id. ,r 39 n.29 ( alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Sittner, 692 P.2d at 736). 
The coordinate judge rule therefore precluded Judge Harris from revisiting 
and reversing Judge Kennedy's ruling. He erred when he violated the rule. 
1.3 Judge Harris Ignored or Weighed Disputed Evidence 
Even if the coordinate judge rule did not prevent Judge Harris from 
reconsidering Judge Kennedy's ruling, and even if Judge Harris had in fact 
reconsidered Judge Kennedy's ruling, Judge Harris's order was still erroneous. 
Judge Harris erred when he concluded that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact concerning whether Build waived its claim for compensation for the 
extra work by failing to provide written notice to UDOT as required by part 1.5 
of the contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered the issue in Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc. v. UDOT, 2011 UT 35, ,r,r 26-33, 266 P.3d 671. In that case, a 
contractor entered into a contract with UDOT to do paving work. Id. ,r 3. The 
contractor believed that the contract permitted ribbon paving, a less expensive 
paving method. Id. UDOT disagreed and required the contractor to use block 
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paving, a more expensive method. Id. ,r 7. After completing the block paving, the 
contractor sought compensation for the additional expenses. Id. ,r 26. The 
contractor claimed that UDOT changed the contract when it required block 
paving. Id. ,r 9. 
The contract contained the same two notice provisions at issue here. Id. 
,r,r 28-29. UDOT argued-like it does here-that the contractor waived its claim 
for additional compensation when it failed to provide to UDOT written notice of 
the II alleged change." Id. ,r,r 26, 31. 
The court held that the question turned upon whether UDOT made a 
"knowing and deliberate change" to the project. Id. ,r 32. If so, the contractor was 
not required to provide notice under the contract. Id. The court held that, "[t]o 
determine whether the ribbon-paving ban was a 'knowing and deliberate' 
change or an 'alleged change' turns on whether [the UDOT engineer] believed 
that the ban altered the contract." Id. ,r 32. 
The same is true here. Judge Harris recognized that the question turned 
upon whether Mr. Harrison understood that he was ordering extra work. 
(R. 15785.) He acknowledged that, under Meadow Valley, written notice of the 
alleged change was required "so long as the resident engineer who directed the 
work did not believe that the work was outside of the scope of work specified in 
the contract." (R. 15785.) 
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But Judge Harris ruled that Build "provided no evidence" indicating that 
Mr. Harrison believed he ordered additional work. (R. 15785 (emphasis added).) 
Judge Harris ruled as follows: 
(R. 15785.) 
Here, UDOT provides evidence indicating that Rex 
Harrison, the resident engineer, did not believe that the 
direction to Build to haul waste material offsite was a 
change to Build' s scope of work. Build has provided no 
evidence to the contrary, and in fact, the evidence 
demonstrates that for nearly one year after the work 
was performed, Build believed that the work was 
within the scope of its contract. Therefore, because 
Build failed to provide written notice as required by its 
contract with UDOT, its claim for breach of contract is 
DISMISSED. 
But in fact, Build provided several pieces of evidence indicating that 
Mr. Harrison understood that hauling the excavated clay was work outside the 
scope of the contract, and that Mr. Harrison ordered the extra work after learning 
that the material could not be stored onsite because of a landslide. 
Specifically, the following evidence was before the court: 
• Language in the contract indicating that "[£]ill slopes may be 
flattened as shown on plans in order to waste excess 
material." (R. 1285, 3114, 3117 (Add. C).) 
• Language in the contract indicating how much excavated 
material would be disposed of at various locations within the 
project site. (R. 1331 (Add. D).) 
• Mr. Harrison's testimony that "the contractor was allowed to 
dispose of excavated material in waste areas" within the 
project site. (R. 13714, 3504 (Add. E).) 
• A change order, completed by UDOT during the project, 
indicating that part of the project "is constructed on an 
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unstable historic land slide" and detailing the "corrective 
action" taken to "improve its stability per Geotechnical 
Engineers['] recommendations." (R. 7743 (Add. F).) 
• Mr. Harrison's testimony that he mstructed Build to haul the 
excess clay offsite based upon an exercise of his "personal 
engineering judgment, along with our geotechnical 
recommendations" after becoming "aware of subsurface 
movement in that particular slide area." (R. 3456, 3511-12 
(Add. E).) 
• A letter from Mr. Harrison, acknowledging that a 
"change[]". . . [ w] as the basis of [Build' s] claim in that 
[ excavated material] could no longer be effectively disposed 
of within the contract limits." (R. 3456-57, 3530 (Add. G.) 
Judge Harris was required to consider all of Build's evidence. On a motion 
to reconsider a summary judgment ruling, the court must consider all of the 
evidence cited in the original motion papers. Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 
P.2d 650, 654-55 (Utah 1994). The court has discretion in deciding whether to 
consider evidence cited in the motion to reconsider. Id. & n.8. 
Here, Judge Harris recognized that he was required to consider the 
evidence cited in the summary judgment papers that were filed before Judge 
Kennedy. (R. 16126 (referring to courtesy copies of the original summary 
judgment papers).) And he exercised his discretion to consider the evidence cited 
in the subsequent motion papers. Indeed, Judge Harris based his decision upon 
UDOT's "evidence indicating that Rex Harrison ... did not believe that the 
direction to Build to haul waste material offsite was a change to Build' s scope of 
work." (R. 15785.) UDOT cited this evidence only in its "motion to clarify," not in 
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its initial summary judgment motion. (R. 11627; 1284-91.) Thus, Judge Harris was 
required to consider all of the evidence Build submitted. 
It is unclear whether Judge Harris failed to consider Build's evidence or 
whether he instead weighed the disputed evidence and determined that UDOT' s 
evidence was more credible. Either way, Judge Harris erred. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that, l'/[o]n a motion for summary 
judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry 
should be whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 
888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). "It is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the 
weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense 
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Here, as Judge Kennedy ruled, Build's claims were "subject to questions of 
fact." (R. 9837.) Based upon Build's evidence, a jury could conclude that 
Mr. Harrison believed that he ordered additional work. Thus, Judge Harris erred 
when he weighed or ignored Build' s evidence. 
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2. Judge Harris Erred When He Dismissed Build's Consequential Damages 
Claim 
Judge Harris also erred when he dismissed Build's consequential damages 
claim, on his own, "for lack of proof," after ruling that neither Ms. Whitacre nor 
Mr. Stromness could testify about Build's value or its lost profits. (R. 15782-83.) 
Not only did Judge Harris lack authority to dismiss the claim for lack of proof, 
the claim in fact did not lack proof. 
UDOT filed a motion to exclude the testimony of both witnesses, not to 
dismiss claims. (R. 10323.) UDOT argued that Build violated rule 26, and that 
exclusion was the appropriate sanction under rule 37. (R. 10337-38, 10341-42.) 
Specifically, UDOT argued that Ms. Whitacre should not be allowed to testify 
because she did not opine about the amount of damages in her expert report as 
required under rule 26(a)(3). (R. 10341.) Similarly, UDOT argued that 
Mr. Stromness should not be allowed to testify because Build failed to provide a 
calculation of its business devastation damages as required under rule 26(a)(1). 
(R. 10337-38.) UDOT sought the exclusion of testimony, not the dismissal of 
~ Build' s consequential damages claim. (R. 10342.) 
Judge Harris agreed with UDOT. (R. 15781-82.) Judge Harris ruled that 
neither witness would be allowed to testify about the amount of Build' s 
consequential damages. (R. 15781-82.) But Judge Harris did not stop there. After 
granting UDOT's motion to exclude the testimony, Judge Harris dismissed 
Build' s claim, ruling that it "fails for lack of proof": 
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Furthermore, Build admitted at the hearing on this 
motion that it intends to rely on Fred Stromness as its 
sole witness on its consequential damages claim. 
Because Fred Stromness' s testimony is excluded, Build' s 
claim for "Consequential Damages from Concurrent 
Conduct" stated on pages 8 through 10 of its Amended 
Complaint fails for lack of proof, and is DISMISSED. 
(R. 15782-83.) 
The dismissal is erroneous for two reasons. First, Judge Harris lacked 
authority to dismiss Build's claim for the reason he articulated. Judge Harris's 
ruling functioned as a ruling on an unfiled motion for summary judgment. In 
effect, he ruled that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
[UDOT] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" on Build' s consequential 
damages claim. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). But a court may not dismiss a claim on its 
own summary judgment motion. Id.; Clifford P.D. Redekop Family LLC v. Utah 
Cnty. Real Estate, 2016 UT App 121, ,r 8, _ P.3d. _ (example of a district court 
properly granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment after excluding 
the only testimony on point). 
Judge Harris had authority to dismiss Build' s claim in other circumstances. 
Rule 41(b) allows a court to dismiss a claim on its own motion, but not "for lack 
of proof." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b). Rule 41 allows a court to dismiss a claim only 
"[£]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with the[] rules" of civil 
procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b); PDC Consulting, Inc. v. Porter, 2008 UT App 372, 
,r 14, 196 P.3d 626. Here, although Judge Harris ruled that Build violated the 
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rules of civil procedure, the violations were not the basis of his dismissal. 
(R. 15782.) Rule 41 therefore does not authorize the dismissal. 
Alternatively, if UDOT believed that Build lacked evidence of 
consequential damages, UDOT could-and should-have filed a motion for 
directed verdict at the close of Build' s evidence at trial. E.g., Cerritos Trucking Co. 
v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). The dismissal would occur 
only after Build had an opportunity to present its evidence, though, not before. 
Second, and more important, the testimony of Mr. Stromness and 
Ms. Whitacre was not the only evidence Build had to support its consequential 
damages claim.6 The exclusion of certain evidence does not demonstrate that no 
other evidence could be presented at trial. Even with the exclusion of the 
testimony, Build's claims did not "lack ... proof." (R.15782.) 
Indeed, as UDOT itself noted below, Build's litigation expenses were "the 
culprit" in Build's cash flow problems. (R. 7172-73.) Kevin Nilsen replaced 
Mr. Stromness as president and CEO of Build and testified that Build's cash flow 
"diminished because of the litigation with UDOT. It sucked over half a million 
dollars of cash out of the company .... When you go from having close to a 
6 Judge Harris is incorrect that "Build admitted at the hearing on th[e] motion 
that it intends to rely on Fred Stromness as its sole witness on its consequential 
damages claim." (R.15782.) At the hearing, Build admitted that Mr. Stromness 
would testify concerning Build's business devastation claim, which constitutes 
only a part of its consequential damages claim. (R.16273-74.) Specifically, Build 
stated that Mr. Stromness would be its witness "regarding the value of Build and 
its profitability," or as Judge Harris put it, "[£]or the number." (R.16273-74.) 
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million dollars in the bank account and that cash flow gets sucked out by legal 
fees, it can pretty much devastate a company." (R. 7249, 7251-52, 7243-74.) 
These expenses are consequential damages. Utah law allows a party to 
recover litigation expenses as consequential damages arising from a breach of 
contract II when the defendant's breach of contract foreseeably caused the 
plaintiff to incur attorney fees through litigation with a third party." Collier v. 
Heinz, 827 P.2d 982, 983-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline 
Equip., L.L.C., 2006 UT App 446, ,r,r 21-22, 147 P.3d 951. The rule is sometimes 
called the "third-party tort rule." Lewiston, 2006 UT App 446, ,r 22 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Here, Build sued Clyde-Geneva, the general contractor, as a result of 
UDOT's breaches of contract on the Legacy project. (R. 195-99.) In other words, 
UDOT's breach of contract caused Build to incur attorney fees through litigation 
with Clyde-Geneva. Under the third-party tort rule, those fees are consequential 
damages in this case. Thus, even without testimony establishing Build' s value or 
lost profits, Build will be able to prove consequential damages. Build' s claim 
does not "fail[] for lack of proof." (R. 15782.) This court should reverse Judge 
Harris' s dismissal of Build' s consequential damages claim. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse Judge Harris' s dismissal of Build' s breach of 
contract and consequential damages claims. 
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DATED this 12th day of July, 2016. 
ZIM1v1ERMAN JONES BOOHER 
Troy L. Booher 
Beth E. Kennedy 
Attorneys for Appellant Build Inc. 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALTLAKECoUNTY,STATEOPUTAH 
SALT LAKE CiTY DEPARTMENT 
BUILD, INC •• a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff; 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judfclal Dfstrfct 
DEC 18 20M 
- r'~ 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; CLYDE-GENEVA 
CONSTRUCTORS A JOINT VENTURE, a 
Utah joint ven~; W.W. CLYDE & _CO., a 
Utah corporation; and GENEVA ROCK 
PRODUCTS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
CaseNo.090904101 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Defendants. 
THIS MA TIER is before the Court on 13 motions comprising 24 binders and a poster ... 
sized flow chart. The Parties extensively briefed the issues and the Court heard argument on 
September 23; 201_4, before talcing the motions under advisement. Three days later, the Court 
entered a Minute Order granting Clyde-Geneva leave to respond to UDOT's motion qn the third-
party complaint and directing the parti~ to submit proposed orders on all pending motions. The 
p~es di4 ~o and the matter h8$ now been submitted for decision. Having carefully reviewed the 
record and considering the arguments of counsel1 the Comt hereby issues the following Order. 
Motions for Summary .Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and •.• the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law/' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
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When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court should not weigh eyidence 
and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonnioving party. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. 
v. Sanpete Couno,, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379. Moreover, ac[i]f there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt sh(?uld be resolved in favor of the opposing party. t, 
Bowen v4 Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 0 The puipose of summary judgment is 
. 
to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense· of trial when it is clear as a matter of Jaw that the 
party ruled against is not entitled to prevail." Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 
P.2d S3, 54 (Utah 1981). 
The follo~ng summary judgment moti9ns are pe~ding: (1) UDOT's motion regarding' 
the Legacy Highway Project; (2) UDOT's motion regarding the Arcadia Road Project; (3) 
UDO'rs motion re.garding the 1-215 Project; (4) UDOT's motion re~ding consequential 
damages; (S) unbrs motion regarding the third-party complaint; and (6) Plaintiff's motion. 
The Court will address each in tum. 
1. UDOT's Motion Regarding the Legacy Highway Project 
This motion is DENIED. Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff does not have a direct 
contract with UDOT, questions of fact exist as to whether Plaintiff is an intended third-party 
~eficiary of the ·contract between UDOT and Clyde-Geneva. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P~d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1989.) (stating that ''the int~n~on of the 
parties is to be detennined from the temis of the contract as well as the surrounding facts and 
cir~cesj. Plaintjff has presented cvideney of smrounding facts· and circumstances that 
supports its positiob and so has UDOT. It will be up to the trier of fact to weigh the ~dence and 
determine whether· Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary and thetby entitled to the relief requested. 
The Court cannot to do so as a matter of law. 
2 
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Nor can ~e Court award summary judgment on Plaintiff's equitable claims .. The law is 
clear that "[r]ecoyery in quasi contract is not available where there is . an express contract 
covering the subject matter of the litigation." Mann v. American W. Life I~s. Co., S86 P.2d 461; 
46S (Utah 1978). But, heret the·parties dispute whether a contract exists that covers the subject 
matter of the litigation. Plaintiff specifically alleges that it performed extra work that was not 
contemplated by its contract with Clyde-Geneva or Clyde-Geneva's contract with tJDOT. 
Moreover, Plaintiff' asserts that UDOT promised Plaintiff directly that it would pay for the extra 
work. Based on the record before the Court, material questions of fact exist that •preclude 
SUJinnaryjudginenl 
'2. UDOT's Motion Regarding the Arcadia Road Project 
. This motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. .Plaintiff's claim for 0 prompt 
payment" under Utah Code Ann. § I S-6-1 fails as a matter of law because the amounts claimed 
are disputed by UDOT and the contract involves disbursement of federal funds by a state agency. 
See U.C.A. § 1S--6-4 ("If the agency fails to pay the amount due on tiine ·because of a dispute 
between the agency and the business over the amount due or over compliance with the contract, 
the provisions of this chapter do not apply."); § 15-6-6 (stating that the statute "does not apply to 
contracts that involve disbursement off ederal funds, or state and federal fundss by the state or its 
agencies''· Plaintiff's. remaining claims are subject to questions . of fac~ including whether 
UDOT breached. its contract wi~ Plaintiff, whether UDOT waived the notice provision and 
whether Plaintiff's claims satisfy the requirements of the Changed Conditions Clause of the 
contract specifications. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for "prompt payment" under U.C.A. § 15-
6-1 is dismissed with prejudice, but Plainti~s remaining claims against ·UDOT regarding the 
Arcadia Project survive. 
3 
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3. UDOT's M~tion Regarding the 1-215 Project 
This motion- is DENIED. Questions of fact exist as to whether Change Order No. 3 was 
intended to be ~- accord and satisfaction, given the language in th~ document and the parties• 
course of dealing thereafter. The record contains conflicting evidence ·as to wheth~ the parties 
had a meeting of the minds S\lfficient to preclude Plaintiff's claims in the instant action. See 
Cove Yiew Excav(lting & Constr. Co. v. Flynn. 758 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App~ 1988) (stating 
that an accord and satisfaction must generally co~ply·witb the essen$1 elements of a ~ntraet, 
ine}uding a meeting of the minds). Questions of fact also ~ist as to whether Utah's Retention 
. 
Statute applies. to UDOT2s alleged~y tardy retentjon payments, including whether Plaintiff 
complied with the prerequisites of that statute. Accordingly, UDOT is not entitled to summary: 
judgm~t on Plainturs claims regarding.the 1-215 Project. 
4. UDOT's Motion Regarding Conscguential Damages 
:This motion is DENIED. Initially, the Court notes that UDOT~s reply memorandum goes 
well ·beyond the issues raised in Plaintiff's opposition memorandum and, therefore, the new 
material will not~ considered. Utah R. Civ. P .. 7(c)(1) (stating that a reply memorandum "shall 
be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition'j. The Court further 
determines that Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable cause of action. whether referred to as 
"consequential damages from concurrent conduct" or "business devastation." Under Utah law;-
Plaintift is entitled to recover consequential damages that.were caused by·UDOT to the extent 
proven to a reasonable degree of certainty and reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting. 
Castillo v. Atlcmta··eas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Reasonable certainty .requires 
damages be prove11 ''with sufficient certainty that reasonable minds might believe from a 
preponderance of ·Ute evidence that die damages were actually suffered." Kilpatrick v. W-zley,'" 
4 
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Rein & Fielding,~2001 UT 107, 1f 76, 37 P.3d 1130. Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence-
most notably in the form of Joan Whitacre's expert opinion - that supports its consequential 
damages claim. 1Jie Court disagrees with UDOT that Plaintiff's theory of damages is either 
insuffictent or somehow precluded as a matter of law. Instead, the Court concludes that there are 
questions of fact as to whether Plaintiff suffered the damages claimed and in what amount. 
Accordingly, UDOT is not entitled t9 summary judgment on Plaintifrs consequential damages 
claim . 
. S.. UDOT's ~otion Regarding the Third-Party Complaint 
This motion is DENIED. ·Issues of waiver and accord and satisfaction present fact 
intensive questiom that are rarely appropriate for summacy judgment. IHC Health Servs. v. D &: 
K }fgmt .• Inc .. , 2003 UT S, 'iJ 7 (referring to waiver as ''an intenselr fact dependent questionj; 
Estate _Landscape. v. Mountain States, 344 P .2d 322, 324 (Utah 1992) (setting forth the elements 
of accord and satisfaction). Here, Clyde-Geneva has pre$etlted evidence indicating that it did not 
j:nteiid to, or agree to, relinquish its right to bring the subject third-party claim. For example; 
Clyd~Geneva points out that the parties engaged in litigation of the subject claim both before 
and after the alleged waiver ani accord and satisfaction. This tends to support Clyde-Geneva's 
argument and is sufficient to preclude smmnary judgment. Similarly. questions of fact exist as to 
whether the contract specifications required Clyde-Geneva to certify ihe subject claim and, if so, 
•• t'f .. • .. .. .. . .. 
whetlier UDOT is ·nevertheless precluded from asserting this defense based on alleged statements 
dming a January 26, 2009 meeting and Plaintiff's subsequent certification of its pass-through· 
claim. The Court is riot in a position on summary judgment to resolve these disputes. 
6. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Swpmary Judgment 
,s 
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This motion is DENIED. With respect to Plaintiff's claims rel.ating to· the Legacy Project, 
the record is replete wi~ disputed questions of fact. including: (1) whether the design plans were 
defective; (2) whether UDOT lmew of the alleged defective design; (3) whether UDOT agreed to 
pay for extra work; (4) whether·UDOtts conduct trlggers estoppel; (5) whether Clyde-Geneva 
breached its contract with Plaintiff; and (6) whether UDOT or Clyde-Geneva was unjustly 
enriched. With respect to Plaintiff's claims regarding the Arcadia Project and the I-21S Project, 
Plaintiff is not entitled to. summary judgment for the ·same reasons UDOT is not ~ntitled to 
~ary judgment as set forth above. 
Motions to Strike 
· The Court'ntles on the various motions to strike as follows: (1) unors Motion to Strike 
Portions of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to· Strike Additional 
Paragraphs of Plaintiff's Motion · for Partial Summary Judgment are DENIED as moot; (2) 
UDOT's Motic;>n to Strike Portions of tiie Stromness Declaration and Motion to Strike Additional 
Portions of the Stiomness Declaration: are DENIED as moot; (3) UDOT's Motion to Strike the 
Schwarm Declaratlon is DENIED; (4) .Plaintiff's Motion to Strike UDOT's Reply/Sur-Reply and 
the Adams Declaration is DENIED; and· (S) Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Declarations of UDOtts 
Witnesses is GRANTED in part - the portions of the declarations that contain opinion testimony 
from undisclosed expert witnesses are stricken. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED thi~ LL day of December, 2014. 
BY THB COURT: 
., 
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IN tiiE raliID JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE-OF UTAH 
BUILD, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TANS_PORTATION, an agency of the State 
of Utah; CLYDE-GENEVA 
CONSTRUCTORS, A JOINT VENTURE, a 
Utahjoirit venture; W. -w~ CLYDE. & CO., a 
Utah CO(pbration;· .. and GENEY A.ROCK 
PRODUCTS·, INC., a Utah c;orporation, 
Defendant. 
CLYDE-GENEVA CONSTRUCTORS A 
JOINTVE;NTJJRE,_a Utahjoint.venture~ W. 
W. CL YOE & CO., a Utah corporation; and 
GENEY A ROCK PRODUCTS, INC., a Utah 
cbipofatioil, 
~ Third Party Plaintiffs 
V. 
UTAII DJ;:PARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; an agency of the State 
·of Utah, 
Third .. Party Defendants. 
Nov~rriber 25,. 201°5 04:09 PM 
ORDER 
Civil No. 090904101 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
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Before:tlie Court are various motjons·in liniine submitted by the parties pursuant.to the Court's 
schedulin·g order of June 10, ·2015.. The Court heard oral argument on these motions on October 
I, 2015. Appearing for Plaintiff Build, Inc. ("Build") were KimJ. Trout of TroutLaw, -and Clark 
Fetzer of Rinehart Fetzer Simonsen & Booth. Appearing for DefendantUtah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT') were Stanfotd P. Fitts and S. Spencer Brown of Strong & Hanni. 
Appearing for-Defendant Clyde-Gene,va Constructors_, a.Joint V~nture, W.W. Clyde & Co., and 
Geneva Rock Products,. inc. ( collectively ,·'Clyde-Geneva'') were Robert F. Babcock and Cody 
W. Wilson of Babcock Scott & Babcock. 
Th~ Co_urt, having n~ad. tp.e-parti~s· ri1~m_or~d~ h1 l>upport of and in ppp9sitiqg to t11.e v¢9_us 
motions, and having heard oral argument on the motions, ml~$ as follows: 
1. Build's Motion to Dismiss UDOT's Motions 
This motion is DENIED. The Court will not dismiss other motions. The Court has the 
discretion· to consider {J.DOT's motions on their merits~ even if thos¢. rilotioris ~e i_n f~t motions 
for reconsideration, and the Court chooses to exercise its di~cretion to hea.r those motions: Qn 
their merits~ 
2. UDOT's Motion and Request for Ruling on Unresolved Legai Issues Raised in 
UJ)OT's M~tion for Summary Jµdgment ()n Build's Claims Concerning the.Legacy 
p·roject. 
This motiqn js GRANTED in. part m1d DENIED in pa~ At the outse~ the Co"Qrt rakes:: 
UOOT's motion as a motion to reco·nsider the Court's prior order denyin.gUDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding the Legacy Parkway Project. Reconsideration ·of an interlocutory 
order isproperiµid~Rule-54(b)-and/orRule56(d) oftheUtahRtiles ofCivil Prqcedure. The. 
Court con~ludes that reconsideratl,pn of.its prior Order i~ n~c¢s,sary in ~1is c~~~-
015778 
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~ 
UDOT asks the Cc,urt to dismiss Build' s four claiin.$ against .it pertaining to the Legacy 
Parkway Project stated fo its Amended Co~plaint:: Build,_s .First Claim for Relief for Breach of 
Implied Warranty, Buitd;s ·second Claim for Relief for Breach of Contract, Build's Third-Claim 
for Relief for Contrc1ct Implied in Law, and Build's Fourth Claim for Relief for Contract Implied 
in Fact. 
UDOT's motion is DENIED with respect to Bttild's First Claim f~r Reli~f for Breac:b of 
Implied Warrano/. The Court. concludes tha~ regardless of any lack of contractual privity, a 
subcontractor who relies on plans and specifications put out for bid by the· owner of a 
constructio_n proje~t may bring. a claim for breach of implie_d warranty against the owner based 
on alleged defects to the plans under Spearin v. Unit~d States., 248 u.·s. 132 (1918). See BRW, 
Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons~ ·99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004). The Court finds BRW, Inc. particularly 
persuasive in light of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court has often drawn on Colorado faw in 
developing its e¢onomic loss rule jmisptudence. 
UDOT' s motion is GRANTED with respect to Build ,.s Second Claim for Relief for 
Breach of Contract. The Court rejects Build's argument of the existence of a direct contract 
between UDOT and Build. Build's claims to a direct contract fail factually~.and fail as a matter 
oflaw. The Court finds that, based·on Meadow Valley Contractors :v. UD01: 2011 UT 35,266 
P .3d 671, the partnering ~harter, which Build daims is a contract, does not c~mstitute a contract 
between the parties. Moreover, none of UDOT's interactions or dealings with Build while on the 
Legacy Parkway Project created a new contract or modify any existing contract. Ratherl those 
interactions are simply the reality of the management of a large-stale con~truction project Build 
has f.aile9 JQ dem9nstrate a meeting ~ftµ~ minds sufficient to form a co,:itracfb.ased on: any ·9f 
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these,i~tetactions. Additioµa.lly, UPOJ;cannot b~ bound contractually to _l3uild utiiess the 
agreement meets the requirements of the Unih ProcurementCode~ Utah Code Ann~-§· 63G~6-
501 ~ The alleged agreements between UDOT and Build do not meet this standard. Therefore, 
thete is• no direct contract between UDOT and Build 
Furthermore, Build is not a third-party beneficiary to the UDOT /Clyde..;Geneva contract 
Utah case law· is. dear that, w.ith respect to a claim of third-pa.rty benefici~ry status by a 
subcontractor, the· written contract between the owner and general contractor must demonstrate 
that tbe·contracting·parties clearly fatendedto. confer a separate-and distinct direct benefit upon 
the subc~ntractc;,r. It is not enough $.at UDQT contemplated that Clyde-Geneva would_ 
subcontract the work at issue in this case, or even that it knewthatClyde-Geneva would 
subcontract with Build~ :See SME Indus.,. Inc. v. Thomson, Ventulett, Stam back & Assocs., Inc., 
2001 UT 54, ,i,r 50-51;Am. Towers Ovmers Ass~n v. CCI Mech., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); 
~ee a_lsi:iLilley v. JP Morgah Chase, 2013 UT App 285~ ,r 5. Therefore, Builcl's Second Claim 
for Relief fa dismissed. 
UDOT' s motion is also GRANTED with re_spectto Build; s Third and Fourth Claims for 
Reliefbeca1.1se claims for breach of implied contracts nec-essitatethat the party making that 
claini have no 'remedy-at law. Here, Build bas remedies at law by way of its direct contract 
c_laims against Clyde-Genev~, an4 by way <;>f i~ Firs~ Claim fqr Re~ief for breach qf warranty 
against UDOT. Therefore, Build has no claim to the equitable remedies sought in its third and 
Fourth Claims for Relief. 
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3~ Bu.ild's Motion in Limi~~ to Exclude T~stimony Regarding Perfonit~ce 
Specifications and to Exclude Improper Legal Conclusions by Expert Witnesses. 
Build,_s motion is DENIEP.The Court concludes that the.specifications regardirig pile 
driving work on the L~gacy Parkway Project are ambiguous with regard to whether they .are 
performan~e spedncatioJlS or design specificati<>ns. In some aspects, the specifications direct 
i8 Build to do certain· things and follow certain procedures, indicating that they are design 
specifications. In other aspects, the specifications provide Build discretion regarding the 
per,formance ofits work. ¥oreover, pile driving tencls to be penormance-based in nature. 
Therefore, because there is ambiguity with regard to_ the que$tion or'whether the pile driving 
work was performed under a performance specification or a design specification, extrinsic 
evidence regatd.ing the parties' intent is needed, ~d tes_tµnony by UDQT'-s witnesses that the 
~pedficatioµ is, in fact., a perfonnanc~ specificatio11,_ is. admfssible ~t trial., at least_ to the ~xtent 
that the witnesses were :properly disclosed. 
4. UDOT's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony by Fred Stromness and Joan 
Whitacre Regarding Build's Value and/or Lost Profits as a Result of Build'.s Claim 
f o·r Business Devastation. 
UDOT moves to exclude the testimony of Build"-s consequential damages witnesses.2 
~ Fr~d Stromness and Joan Whitacre, at trial. Clyd~~Geneva joins UDOT's motion~ Thi$ motion is 
GRANTED. Joan Whitacre ·offered. an opinion regarding causation in her report~ and she would 
be allowed to testify as to ca~sation. But she did not ever attemptto quantify consequential 
damages, and for thi~ reapon she will not allowed to testify at f;rial regarding the amounl of 
consequential damages claimed by Build~ither in tenns of lo$S of Build, s -value -or in terms of 
lost profits-because she provided no opinion on this subject in her report or in her deposition. 
Fred Strorriness is excluded from testifying to the amount ofBuild's claimed 
-01578'1 
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co;nseque.ntial damages p~cause:Bqild has violat~dJhe disclosure r~quirements of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in at least two particutars wfrh respect to his testimony on this claim. Fir.st, 
Build violated Rule 26(a)(l)(c) of the Utah Ru1es of Civil Procedure when it failed to provide a 
computation of its-claimed consequential dani.ages•in its initial disclosures, and subsequently 
failing to supplement its disclosures to provide the required computation. At the time of the 
hearing, Build has still never provided :the r~quired computation, and up~m questipning~ its 
counsel was unable to do so at ·the hearing. Under Rule 26,. the plaintiffhas an obligation to 
provide<this information at the outset of the case, without request from the.opposing party. This 
early disclosure is designed to allow early evaluation _of a case, and is essential, espec~ally when 
the disclosure. involve.~ whatBuild suggests to be a claim wonh ~ore th~ $15,000~000. Build 
also violated Rule 30(c )(2) of the· Utah Rules of Civil Procedure·when its counsel instructed 
Fred Stromness not to answer questions pertaining: to how Build's consequential damages would 
be calculated, withq~t a.riy permissible _basis. Build' s ac:ts are unacceptab_le,_ 'imd have create4 ~ 
situation where the defendants have not received a. damages calculation,. even long after 
discovery has closed and a trial date is set. Because Build violated the Utah Rules of Ci vii 
Procedure as noted above by failing to disclose its damages c·omputatio~~ Fred Sttomness 1s 
excluded from testifying as to the amount of Build's claimed consequential damages-pursuant to 
Rule 37(£) of the Utah.Rules of Civil ·Procedure. 
Purthermo.re,_ Build admitted at the hearing on this motio.n that it. intends to re~y on Fred 
Stroniness as its sole witness on its consequential damages claim. Because Fred Stromness's 
te~tjmony · i$ excluded, B\1ild' s daint for "Consequential Damages from Conc"Qrrent Conduct" 
stated .ot:t pag~s 8 -through l O of its .Am.~nded Coinplah# fails for lack of pio9f,j1!}(1. i~ 
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DISMISSED. 
5. Clyde-Geneva's Motion· in Limine to Preclude the Expert Testimony of Jerrold R. 
·cutp . 
.Clyde.-Geneva moves. to exclude the testimony ofBuild~s damages expert, Jerrold R. 
Culp, at triai. .Clyde-Geneva claims that the methodology that Culp used to calculate damages on 
~ the Legacy Parkway Project is inherently unreliable and was unreliably-ap_plied to the. facts. 
Clyde-Geneva also claims that Culp i_s unqualified to render his opinion because he lacks the 
necessary kpowledge, skill, experience and training including that he has never been a pile 
drivjng contractor or a geoteclmical engineer. Clyde-Geneva asserts that:, therefore, Culp. should 
be excluded from testifying pursuant to Rule 702 ofthe Utah. Ru1es of Evidence. UDOT joins 
Clyde-Geneva's motioa 
This mQticm is DENIED. While.the Cq_µrl recogniz~s that there may be some flaws fu 
Culp's methodology,. any such flaws can be addressed through cross-examination at trial, and g;o 
to Culp's credibility. Any such flaws are not sufficientfor the Court to exercise its gatekeeper 
function under Rule 702 of the.Utah Rules of Evidence. 
6. Plaintiff's Motion in Limin_eto Exclude Clyde-Geneva's E.l.-pert Witne_sses 
.Build. _argqes h~re that the· Court should exclude all of Clyde-Geneva's expert witne~ses 
because they were improperly and untimely designated. This motion is DENIED. Clyde.:.Geneva 
did not designate any of its own witnesses. Rather~ Clyde-Geneva joined in the desi~ation of 
each ofUI)OT'~ expert wimesses. Ex.pe~ reports fot·each witness were produced o_n time, 
pursuant to an extension granted by Build. Therefore,. there ·is no basis upon which to grant 
Build' s motion. 
7. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding E~pert Opinion Testimony of James Higbee 
015783 
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~n<l Steven Niebergall. 
Build asks: the Court .to exclude expert testimony bytwo UDOT employees-James 
Higbee and ·steven Niebergall-to the extent that it constitutes expert testimony. Specifically, 
Build points to several paragraphs of declarations submi~ed by these witnesses in support of 
UDOT's suminary judgment memoranda, which Build argues constitutes scientific, technical, or 
other specia}iz~d lawwledge on th~ subjects of geqtechnical engineering a.J)d pile driving. 
The motion is GRANTED IN PART. No witness called.by either party, unless timely 
disclosed.as an expertWitness, will be alfowed to testify at trial regarding-subjects that fall under 
Rule 702 of ,h~ Utah RuJes ofEvidenc¢. Thus, neither Mr. Higbee notMr.Niebergall--nor any 
other wi mess not properly disclosed as an expert--may testify "lJout the standard of care, or give 
. . 
opinions about what is reasonable·. and what is not, unless that testimony is ·invited or the door is 
opened. However) the Court recognizes that because of the technical nature of the: subject 
matter of thisJaw~µit, $ome fact witness· testimony will be technical at ~im¢s. S11ch testimony 
will be·pemiitted, and. the Court will rule on the admissibility of any specific ,testimo}l.y at the 
time-of trial. 
8. UDOT's Motion for Ruling and Clarification on L~·gal Issues Not Yet Addressed or 
Ruled Upon ~egarding UDOT's M.o~ion f()r Summary Judgm.ent..on Bui•d;s Cl;iiins 
Concerning the Arcadia Project. 
In this motion, UDOT argues that Build'~ sixth claim for relief for breach of.contract 
should be dismiss~d bec~use Build failed to abide by the notice provisions of its contract with 
UDOT, and that Build'-s seventh and eighth claims forrelief should be dismiss·ed· because Build 
bas a remedy at law-·~runely the contract between it.and UDOT.. The Court GRANTS this 
motion, ·bas.ed on Me.a.if ow V~lley Corjtrac}ors. v~ UDOT, 2011 lJT 35, 2<;i6 P .3d 671. 
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In Meadow Valley, the Utah Supreme Court considered contract provisions identical to 
the notice provision here. The Court concluded that, based on the language of the notice 
provision (Specification 0725, Section 1.7), a contractor was required to provide notice of an 
"alleged change" to the project within five clays of the directive to perform the work at issue. 
There, as here, the contractor argued that no notice was required because UDOT directed the 
work, so it was already on notice of the change. The Utah Supreme Court di~agre~d, and held 
that the contractual provision applied so long as the resident engineer who directed the work did 
not believe that the work was outside of the scope of work specified in the contract. 
Here, UDOT provides evidence indicating that Rex Harrison, the resident engineer, did 
not believe that the direction to Build to haul waste material offsite was a change to Build's 
scope of work. Build has provided no evidence to the contrary, and in fact, the evidence 
demonstrates that for nearly one year after the work was performed, Build believed that the 
work was within the scope of its contract. Therefore, because Build failed to provide written 
notice as required by its contract with UDOT, its claim for breach of contract is DISMISSED. 
Build,s seventh and eighth claims for relief are DISMISSED because, as discussed 
above, a party cannot seek an equitable remedy-including contract implied in law or in fact-
when there is.an available remedy at law covering the same scope ofworlc. In this case> because 
the contract between UDOT and Build contemplated extra work and changes to the work, 
Build's remedy lies in that contract. Therefore, it cannot seek an equitable remedy. 
9. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Evidence Regarding Duchesne 
County. 
Because Build's claims arising out of the Arcadia Project were dismissed as a result of 
the Court's ruling on the above motion, the parties agreed that this motion is moot. 
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The Court has considered Build's objections to the form of this order, and has sustained 
several of them by incorporating Build's suggested language into this order. To the extent not 
incorporated herein, Build's objections to the form of this order are OVERRULED. 
***EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT AS INDICATED BY THE DATE 
AND SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE.*** 
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SECTION 00725 
SCOPE OF WORK 
PARTI GENERAL 
.1.1 RELATED SECTIONS 
A. Section O I 282: Payment 
B. Section01355: Environnietital Protection 
C. Section O I 741: FinaJ Cleanup-
t.2 REFERENCES 
A. Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and f-lighways (MUTCD) 
A. furnish alf resources and incidentals required to complete the specified work. 
1~4 PARTNERING 
A. Partnering does not change the legal relationship 9.fthe parties to the Con.tract1 
and· dQes _not relieve either party from any oft~~ term~ of the· Contract. . 
B. The Departmei-it encourages the formation of a strong p~rtnership among the 
Department1 the Contractpr, _and the Contractor's pri:ncipa'J sub~oo~ctor.~. This 
partnership cf.raws on the strengths of each organizatic>n to id~ntify and achieve 
C. 
mutual goals. · 
~<.>th the.DepEt_rtment and the Contractor agree to and share equally any c_ostc; to 
accomplish partnering. 
D. Wo1·kshops may he held periodicalJy as agreed by the. Contractor and the· 
Department. 
Sc.ope of Work 
00725. ---·Page J of l I 
January 1, 2005 
002426LE_049927 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
·1 .5: DIFFERING SITE C_ONDITIONS, CHANGES AND EXTRA WORK 
A. Promptly:notify the Engineer in writing of alleged changes:to the Contract due to-
differing site ccinditioits. extra·work .. altered wo'i·k beyond the s·coj,e of the 
Contract .. or actfo11s taken by (he Depaf1ment thlll change the Contract fe1ms antj 
conditions. Conditions tq repor~ include: 
B. 
I. Conditions. differing materially from those indicated in the Contract. 
·2. Unknown physical coi1ditions of ai1 unusual 'riature, differing materially 
from t~1ose ordii1arily encountered and generally recognized as inherent to 
the work provided foa- in the Conti·act. 
Op not p~rform f ~Jther work 9r incur further confract it~n1 expense relating: to ·the 
~iaimed change after the date th~ change allegedly occurred .. unless directed 
otherwise in writing by the Ei1gineer. · 
C. l mmediate_ly n_otify tl:te r:;1_1ginecr verbally <,if the nllegcd c~1angc 0.r cx_tra··wqrk 
occasioned by differing site conditio_ns or actions_ by d,e_ Department~ Provide the 
following applicable infor1iiati'on to the Engineet· i11 Writing within five.-calendar 
·gays of the dafo t_hc change or actior1 was noted: 
1. The d~te,of occ.urrencc and the nature;: and circumstances ofthe QCCurrence 
that constitute a:change. 
2. Name, title~ and activity ofeach Department representative· knowledgeable 
of the claimed change. 
3. Identity of ant documents and the substance of any orai communication:_ 
invo_lved in the claimed change. . 
4. B~is ·rot a ·claim qf accelerated, schedule performance, if appJicabl~~ 
5. Basis for a claim that the work is not required by the Contract. if 
applicable. 
6. Failure,. to provide the' required notice·constitutes a waiver of any and all. 
cJairn~ that may ari_se a;, a r.esult of t~_e_ aUeg~d cl)ange~ Departt~ent do~s 
not ali9.w adjustments to the Contract that benefit the Contractor unless_ the 
·contractofhas provided the required written notice. 
D. Pai~cular efe.men'-'5 of contract perfo1mance for whic"h additional compensation 
may be sought include: 
I. 
2~ 
3. 
4. 
-5. 
Pay items that have been or may be affected by the claimed change. 
Labor or materials, or both, that are added, deleted or wa~ted by the 
claimed· <;ha.nge and what e_quipment is idled or r~quired._ 
Delay and disruption in the manner .~nd sequence of p~rformance that has 
been or will be cai1sed, 
Adjustments to cc;mtract pr~~es, delivery schedules. staging, _and contract 
time estimated due to the claim~d change. 
Estimate of the time within which. the Departtnent must respond to the 
~oti~e to minimize cost~ delay, or disruption ofpetformance. 
Sc.ope of Work 
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E. After notifying the Engineer. and in the ~1bscncc ofdi~c~tjons rcc~ivcdto the 
contrary fro•n an authorized. representative ot lhe Department, continue diligenl 
prosecution <>fthe work undet· the Contta.cr to the maxinium. extent possible undei• 
the.contract provisions. 
F. Within IO calendar days after reccipl or not'ice. the Engineer responds in writing 
to the Contractor to: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Confirm that a change occurred and~ when necessary .. direct the method 
an.d manner Qf further performanc~~ .or 
Deny that a change occurred and. when necessary .. direct the method and 
manner off urther performance, or 
Advise the. Contractor that information necessa,·y for deciding to confirm 
or deny the change has not been submitted~ and indicate what information 
is needed foHurther 'review and date by which the Contractor should 
suqmit it to the Engineer. The Enginee1· ~spqnqs to_ such additional 
information wi~hin IO ca lcndar days qf receipt from the Contl'actor. 
Modify-the Contract.in writing accordingly. 
G. Any adjustments. !llad~ to the Conlra~t dq 11(,)t include incn;ased compensation or 
tiiue extens.ions for delay ~suiting from the Contractor's failure to provide 
additional .information requested by the Engineer. 
1.6 SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF WORK 
A. The: Engineer re~erv~s tl~e r.ight at any tim~ during the w9rk to.ma~e written 
changes in quantities and alterations in the work that are necessary to 
satisfactorily. complete the p,~oject. · 
B. Such changes in quantities· and alterations·do not invalidate the Contract or release 
the surety, and the Contractor agrees to perforin the Work as altered. 
C. Department adju.sts the Contract, excludfng anticipated .P~fits, if the alterations or 
changes in quantities significantly change the character of the work under the 
Contract. 
1. Such alterations or chang~s ~an be.in.themselves significant changes to the 
character of the work, or by their effect1 can cause other work to become 
signiftcantiy different in character~ 
2. Agree upori the basis for Contract adjustment before beginning work. 
3. Ir a Qasis c(lnnot be _agreed upon. ·th~ Engineer may order the work to 
proce~d under the Force Account provisions ofSyction 01282. 
D. If the alterations or changes in quantities do not significantly change the character 
ofthe work to be performed under the Contract, the Department pays for ·the 
altered work as provided elsewhere in the· Contract. 
Scope of Work 
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E. The term ""significant change'~ applies onlytQ_the fo.llowin.g circumstances: 
I. When the character .. ofthe altered 'Work differs materially.in kind ot nature 
from that involved or iilcluded in the original proposed constrµction; oi• 
2. When a major item of work. as dcfineddsewher~ in the (.::onlract. is 
incr~ascd in ~x~ess of 125 percent or d<!cre~scd befo.w 75 p~rc~nl of the 
original contract quantity. 
n. Any adjustment for an increase in quantity applies only to that 
· portion i11 excess ~f 125 percen.t of the 9rigi11a_l con.tract qmmtity. 
b. When a majQr it~ni of work is decreased below75 percent of the 
estimated qua11thy, the Department pays actual costs up to a 
·maximum amoi1nt equal to the dollar v~li.ie of 75 perce_nt of the 
e.stimatec.i quantity at the Contract unit price-. The Depart1nent does 
not allow for any other ct>nipensation resulting fi·om work 
d~creaseq befoW75 percent of the estimat~d qua.nHty. 
3. When a.minor item qfwQrk. as d~fined dsewher~ ii1 the ContrlJct, is 
in~rc·~sed in excess of I ·SO percertt·or: decreased below 50 percent of the 
original contract ·quantity~ · 
a. · Any adjustnwnt tbr an increase ~n quantity applies only to t}:lat 
portion i.n ~x~ess of 150 perccnrofthe origfoal co_n.tr~~t quantity. 
b. When a mino1~ itcri1 of work is.decreased .bdow·SO pci•ccnt ofthe 
estimated quantity, the Department p·ays actual costs up to a 
max_imum amount' equal_ tc>. the. do_llar val~e _of 5°() percent of the 
estim~ted quantity. ~t the Coi1tract. unit prfo~,. The bepartment does 
not allow for ~ny.other compensatio1t resultii1g fron1 work 
de~reased beJ9~· 5.0 p~rcient of the ~ti mate~ quantity~ 
4. Adjustments may be ~ither for or against the. Cont~actor in such an: amount 
·the Engineer may determine to be fair and equitable. 
1.7 SUSPENSIONS OF WORK ORD.ERED BY THE ENGINEER 
A. . lf_the Engineer suspends or <iel_ays in writi~g ~,e perf~r,rian~~ of ~I I or :any pc;>rtion 
<lfthe, work for an unre.asonabJe per.ioc_i of't~me (not_origin~fly anticipated, 
customary, or inherent fo the construction industry)~_and the Contractor believes 
t~~t a:dditional compensation qt c9ntract time or both ~re due as a_ result of such 
$.uspension or qefay, submit to the l;ngineer ~ wri.tten.requ~~Hqr adjufittne.nt . 
within seven calendar days of receipt of the ·notice to resume wqrk. Explain in the 
B. 
request the reasons and support for such adjustment.· · 
Upon receipt of request,' the Engi_neer: 
I. .Evaluates the request. 
2. Adjusts (excluding profit)and modifies the Contract in writing 
.-~ccordin.gly~ if the E11gineer agree~ t.hat: 
a. °The susp~nsion increased the cost and/or time requi.red for the 
performance -ofthe Contract 
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b. The _suspension was caused by conditioiis beyond the c.~nfrol of 
and not th~ fooft of the Gontra~(or, it.s suppli~_rs, 9r sµbcontra<;tors 
at any approved tier; 
c. The suspension· was·not caused b,Yweathcr. 
C. The.Engineer notif1e~ the Contractor of whether or no~ JU1 adjustnJenl of the 
Contract iswarranted. 
D. Dep~utm~ntdoes notal!o~ adju~tmC!nt to th~ Contrac~ unle~$ the Contractor has 
submitted the request for adjustment within .seve.n cal~ndar days of-receipt of the 
notice· lo re..~ume work. 
E. Department does not allow adjustmcn~ to the Contra-ct to the extent that _. 
pe1foniiance would have been suspended or delayed by ahy other cause, or for 
which an _adjustm~nt is pro\dded· for or excluded unde1; any·other term or 
condition.of thi~ Qontract. 
t.8 MAIN'TAINING TRAFFIC 
A. Keep roads ·opeli to traffic during the work and work suspensions oi- p1·ovide a·nd 
main~ai11 dcfour roads as specified or·dirc~tcd. 
I~ Keep publicly 13.,n_d pdyately us~d roadways in a cqndition that saf-'ely and 
adequateiy accommodates traffic 24 hours a day and seven days a week. 
2. Provide traffic control in coinpliance,with the,currenteditioh of the 
Manual on Uniform-Traffic Con~rol Devic~s for Street$ aod Highways 
(MUTCD). the traffic Control provisions or the Specifications. and the 
Traffic Control Plans. · 
~- Maintain the sections r:;,f road unqergoiflg improvement. 
4. Failure to maintain traffic is cause for the Department to· take action to 
meet the requirements of this specification. D~partment deducts its costs 
incurred_ in such action from money due the Contractor. 
B. Snow removal is not required during periods. of winter ~hutdown or when the· 
Departtnent sttspends construction operations •. The" Department does not 
additiom~Jly ·compensate for maintenance except forspecific work directed by the 
Engin~er. 
C. Suspensions ordered by the Engineer: The .Department maintains temporary 
roadway"s and portions of the project during wo1~k suspensions. 
1. Resµ~e, rpai_nt~nanc.~ f9r tt,e entire proje(?t on(?~ work procee~.s~ 
2. Replace:or restore ahy work 01· matedaJs lo$t or dam·aged because of 
tem·porary use of the project. · · 
3. Remove worko_r materials used for temporary maintenance; arid complete 
the project as though the. work had been continuous and without 
interference. 
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4. Dcpartnicnt ·pays for maintcnan~e required for events .beyond the 
Contt-aclo(s control dudng work suspensions at c·m1ttacfprices.or as extra 
work. · 
D. Other Suspefisions of Work: Maihtain tl,e roadway at no additional cost to 
Oepartnient to accommodate t~ffic during SL1spe1isions resulting from~ 
i. Seasonal o.r climaii9 condhions. 
2. Failure to correct condi.tions unsafe for the workers or the general public. 
3. Failure to ~any out orders of the ~·ngin.eet. 
4. Any other reasons caused by the Co!ltractor. 
1.9 USE OF ON-SITE MATERIALS 
.A. Obtain ~pprovtil b~fore.. using e,:tcavated, n,aterials found o~ the wqrk siJe ~hat a.re 
·suitable for completing other bid items ofwork. The Department pays for the 
quantity of ex:cavated· mutefoi:ls at the Contract unit price'.for "i"oadway excavation 
and u~der the pay item fqr which th~ n)~teriat·is used. 
B. Replace ·extavated material used.for completing other bid lteins·ofwork with 
a<!cepta~Je ma~erial .~t no ·additipi,al cost ~o the J)epartment. 
L Oepattme.nt doe$_ not charge tpr th~ materi~ls used~ . 
2. Obtain approval before excavatingmateriai outs"ide· grading Hn1itsbut 
within the highway right-of-way~ 
J·. Compact replacement material to the density requirements specified for 
roadway embankmcntconstructioi1. · 
C Struc·ture_ materfa11s designated for 1·emoval may be qsed te_mporarily fa the work. 
1.10 FINAL CLEANUP 
A. Clean' the highway, proj~t, borroW and. local matedal source sifos~ and all areas· 
occµpi~d i" cqnnection with the work ot all rubbish, excess materials, t~mpornry 
structures, and equipment, etc. before final inspection and acceptance. Refer to 
Section OJ 741. 
i.U RESTORATION OF SURFACES. OPENED BY.PERMIT 
A. Allow individl.lals, firm or corporaiion-With authorized permits to enter the project 
to construct or reconstruct any utiHty service. 
B. Repair damag~ ~ause~ by the._permit.h~,ld~r when dire:cte~. D~partm~nt pays for 
repair work as extra work, or as provided in the Contract. 
S~ope of W 9rk 
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t.12 RAILWAY -HIGHWAY PROVISIONS 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
The Department arranges with the railway for-new crossit'igs or fo1· existing 
crossings used during the work. 
Obtain ~pproval from the rai lwtty and pay for the use or crossings not specified in 
the Contract. 
Avoid accidents., damage. unnecessary de.lay .. or any interrerence with·.thc 
movemenfoftra ins .. traffic of the raihvay compa11y .. or othet property. 
Department does ~ot reimburse for raili•oad flagging and inspection. 
H_old a precons.truction conferenc~ ancJ give writt~n notice.t9. lhe Manage.r of 
indus.try anq Public Projects or equivalent position for the railrc;>ad ~omp~ny, 
when railroads are fovolved, at le'ast I 5. days before heginoing_any co1istrLiction· 
work on railroad right-of-way·. Coc,rdimile ·~1 work schedule based on the actual 
date both partfos can begin work. 
F. Give at least 4~ hours verqal n.otice to the Manager of Track M~inten.ance or 
equivalent position for the.railtoad company having· responsibility for the. area the 
project is in before beginr1ing \vork once the work dates have been established. 
G. Give writt~n ·notification to the Superintendent or equ}valent position fe~t:five. 
days befonfany cancellation of work~ and 15 days before continuing work. 
H. Execute a f.llght:-of-gn~ry Agreement with the railroad company priqr t~l 
performing arty work within thetaifroad's right-of-way. Send executed cop_ies .of 
this agreement to the Engineer and UDOrs· Region Utilities and Railroads 
Coordinator. 
I. Cleanup the rigbt..:of-way to the satisfaction of the railroad company. Contractor 
pays for any cleanup done by the raiJroad compa.ny"to the railroad company's 
right-of-way that should have been don~ by the Contractor. 
J. Railroad coinpany pefaoqnel do flagging and inspection when work: and/or 
equipment o'fth~ Contra~tor is. within 2.5 ff of any of the taikoad company's 
tracks. 
K. Determine the cost of required railroad flagging and/or inspection and cleanup 
crew. Include these costs in mo~Hization. · 
Scope of Work 
Q0725- Page 7 of t I 
January 1,.2005 
002432LE_04993.3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L. lJDOT deducts payment under-a construction accounting iten1 foa~ "Railroad 
Flagging. l'nsp·ection and Cl~amlp/~ and_ pay~ the .railroad di reedy for v~rified 
billings. No qther compcnsatiqn tp the -Contra~tor forthis item is allowed. 
M. Refer to proje·ct plans for name~ ofrailrqad companies .• 
l.13 ~ONSTJ{UCTION OVER OR ADJACENT TONA VIGAB.LE WATER.~ 
A. Do not interfere :with the navigation of waterways when conducting work over, 
on, or adjac~nt to navigable w~tcrs. 
B. Comply with ali .conditions ofU,e pe·rmit from the U.S. Coast Guard or the U.S. 
Army Corps of Etjgineers. 
1.,14 CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSIBJLITY FOR WORK 
A. Protect il,e work against i1tjury or damage frorn all causes whether or not related 
to performing the ·work until written accepti.itnce of the proJect is given. 
B. Re.build. repai'r, restore, and ri1ake good a-U iosses~ huui'ies, Or" daniages to· ariy 
portion of ~he work, undeL· the conti"ol ofth~ Co11tractorat no cost to the 
Qepartment h~tore receiv'ing final acceptance. · 
C. Rebu i1d1 repair, -resfore, and n1ake good all loss~s, injuries, or damages to any 
portiqn of the work, f.ll1t under the control of the Co.ntr~ci61:, un.der agreed ~nit 
prices or as extra work urider Sec.lion 0 1282. 
D. 
l. Items not under the Contractor's-control include, -but are not limited to, 
acts of God or other cataclysmic phenomenaof nature, acts of the. public 
enemy, or acts of gov~rnr,nentai authorities. damage cau~ed 'by third party 
errant vehicles, and vandalism. · 
When work is sqspended for any cause: 
t-. •P.rotect thC: project'from damage. 
2. Provide for normal drainage~ 
:t Erect _any necess~ry t~mporary st.rµc.tures .. signs, or othei" facilities. 
4.. Maintajn all newly established plantings, s~~_ding. and ~odding and protect 
new tree growth and other designated vegetative growth in acce·ptable 
condition. 
l.15 ENVIRONMENTAL FROTECJ"'ION. 
A. Refer to S~ion m ·3s~. 
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1.16 VALUE F;NGINEEIUNG -CQNTRACTORPROPOS.ALS 
A. .Stwings resulting from a Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECPJ oi°fered by 
tbe Cont,·actor and approved by the Depai"tment is slufrcd equally. · 
B. Base contract bid prices on specifie.d work rat~er than on VECPs ~hat are subject 
to Depart111ent approval. lfa VECP is rejected. complete the Contract as bid. 
C. The Department consider~ proposals that may potenfo:,lly &}!suit in savings with9ut 
damaging essential functions.and chat·acteristics·ofthe facility, including but not 
limited to service lite> econoniy of operation, ease of-maintenance. desired ability, 
saf~ty, and approx,imate estimated~avings! 
·t.17 VALUE ENGINEERING -SUBMITTING PROPOSALS 
A. Submit t_he fqllowing ri1atetia(~ and informatfon with each proposal! 
1. A statement thatH1e submi~sion is a VECP. 
2.. A descriptfon of the:existing work and the proposed cha1igcs for 
perforrning the work. Disctiss the comparative aqvantages and 
&sad vantages of each. . . . 
3. A complete s~tofplans ~nd specifications showing proposed revisions to 
the oflginal Contract. 
4. A detailed cost~stimate for p~rforming thew~rk under the existing 
Contract and underthc; proposed change. 
·$. A time frame within which the Department must tn'ake a decision. 
6. A statement ofthe probable effect ·the proposal would have on. the contract 
completion time. 
7. A description of any previous use or tests of the proposal,the conditkms, 
and the result and the dates> project numbers, and the Department's action 
on the proposa1 if previously submitted. 
B. The Department determines and notifies the Contractor within five working· days 
that .there is ir1sufiicient revie~dm~ for a· respo·nse~. 
C. The Departn1erit evaluates the need for a non-compensable delay adjustment to 
the Contract based on ~dditiorial review time necess·ary and .its effect ori the 
Contractor•s .schedule. . 
D. The Contractor has no claim against the Department for compensable or 
·nonc6IT1pensable delay re$i.Hting froni the failute·to respond within the-tilne 
indicated in this artic.1~ when additional infor111ation is nece~sary to comple((; t~e 
review. 
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1.18 VALUE ENGINEERJNG·-CONDITlONS FOR PROPOSALS 
A. The Oepartm~n·t only consid~rs VE(:Ps that.meet the following conditions: 
I. Yalue en_gineer1ng pro.posals. regardle·ss of their approval by the 
Departmen4 apply only to the currei1t proposal and.become ·prope·rty of the 
Dcparb'r!e~t; 
a. Submit proposa,s without restricdons· on use or disclosure. 
b. The Depa11ment may dupl icate:or disclbse any data necessary to 
. use the proposal. 
c. Th~ Department ~.an apply a proposal for general us~ on other 
C:0ntracts it administers. 
d. Th~ purpose of this provision is·to ensure legnl right with respect 
t9_ paten~ed materials qr proc~sses. 
8. lJs~ only proven features tha,t have been- employed under similar conditions or 
projects acceptable to·the Dep~rtment. 
C. ·the O~partinent decides whetlwror not tq accept.a proposal. Basis for proposal 
rejectioit inch.ide 1-equirements for excessive 1·ev"iew~ evaluation.arid/or 
investigation, or inconsistelicy with project ~e~ign policies or criteria. 
D. The Department rejects proposals that; 
1. Provide equivalentoptions·to thosfatready in the Contr_act 
i!' R.e,duce overail pavem~nt str1.1ctural value. 
E. VECPs related to pavement section changes must inciude the following: 
F. 
I. A pavern~nt design f~r each pavesnen.t _section i"~ the proposal, perf~rmed 
according to the UDdT Pavement Management.and Pavement D~sign 
Guide. · 
:2. A life-cycle cost analysis that identifies the benefits, pverall co.stsavings·, 
or in~rease in quality. ·to 1he Department, based 011 the new pav_ement 
section. 
3. Doci.mie11tation from· an AASHTO ·accredited iab regardi~g the 
deter01_i_riati~n of-strj.tcti:Jral properties pf any mat¢.r~a"ls not currentty 
"identified within-the contra~t. 
Th~ Departinelit may reject proposals that:· 
1.- Contain revisions ~he Departm·ent is already" ce>nsidering or ha~. approved 
for the C<;>ntract. 
2. Do not generate: sufficient savings. 
3. Do not provide addit1·onal inforrriat1ori as-requested by the Department 
incJuding_requestsfor fie~d.investigatlQi1 r.es~lts and s~rvey~, d~sign_ 
c:ompu.tations, and field change sh~et for pn:>posed c,!esign ch~nges. 
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G. If the proposal is rejected. the Contractor has no claim lo additional costs or 
delays. includi_ng development costs, l_oss of anticipated profits, or increased 
material or lahm· costs. 
H. The Engineer can reject all unsatisfactory work resulting from an approved 
proposal. 
I. 
I. Remove rejected work and reconstruct under the original contract 
p1·ovisions at no additional cost·to Department. 
2. Rcimbur~cment for modifications to the proposal to adjust field or other 
conditions is limited to the total amount of the contract bid prices. 
3. Rejection or limitation of reimbursement is not basis for any claim ag~inst 
the Department. 
The Department does not consider savings generated by contingency ilems when 
it is reduced as part of a VECP, unless it can be tied to a reduction in• contract 
time. 
1.19 VALUE ENGINEERING - PAYMENT 
A. The Dcpartrnent pays by change order for Value Engineerii1g proposals accepted 
in whole or in part. Department pays as follows: 
PART2 
PARTJ 
1 . The Contract incorporates changes in quantities of unit bid items, and/or 
new agreed p1·ice items, as appropriate. 
2. Department pays directly for cost of the revised work. The Department 
pays the. Contnictor 50 percent of tht! savings reflected by Lhe difference 
between cost of revised work and the original bid price. 
3. Department does not reimburse costs to develop, design, and iniplement 
the proposal. 
4. Only a Contractor may submit proposals and be reimbursed for savings. 
The Contractor can submit proposals for an approved subcontractor. 
PRODUCTS 
EXECUTION 
Not used 
Not used 
END OF SECTION 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
BUILD INC. , a Utah 
corporat i on, 
-oOo-
)Depositioil o.f : 
) 
Plaintiff , )REX VERNAL HARR3SON 
vs . 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTAtION, an 
agency of t h e State of 
Utah; CLYDE - GENEVA 
CONSTRUCTORS A JOINT 
VENTURE , a Utah j o int 
ventrire; W. W. C~YDt & 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CO., a Utah corpGration;) 
and GENEVA ROC~ f 
PRODUCTS , INC . , a Ut~h ) 
corporation, jciyii Np . Q~U9P4J0 1 
) 
Defendants. ).Judge Kenneciy 
) 
- ---------- ----
- oOo -
August 16 , 2013 - 9 : 00 a.m. 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
J~~nifer L . Nater 
Registered Professional Repo-r t er 
Ce~ t i f ied Sho~t h arid Reporter 
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D.eposition of ~ex Vernal .. Harriso_n E~~INATION Bl MR. TROOT 
1 Duchesne County and UDOT that I was that person 
2 in responsible ch~rge t~ere. 
Q. For the Bridgelcµid project, was 
4 there a cooperative agreement between Duchesne 
5 County and l.1])0T? 
6 
7 
A •. 
Q. 
Yes, there was. 
Let me go back. 
e· When you say proposal , did Horrocks 
9 Engineers make a proi;:>'osal to UDOT to act- as the 
10 resident engineer for the Brid~eland project~ 
11 A •. No. We we·re selected be.cause we 
12- were in a preapp,roved pool of consulta_nts to dq 
13 local government project work. We were selected 
14 out of that pool. 
_15 I guess, yes, w~ did prop_ose to get 
16 in the pool. 
17· Q. When yo_u say selected, would t be 
18- correct in understanding that you were seiected 
19. by UDOT? 
20 
21 
A •. 
Q. 
22 se1ection? 
23 
24 
2·5 
A. 
Q. 
We. were. $elected by Duchesne County. 
I see. Did UDOT approve of that 
Yes, they did. 
Let's D\Ove to the Arcadia project. 
Can you tel1 us, p1ease, what your 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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Depo~itio.n of Rex Vernal Harrison EXJl.MINATION BY MR. .TROUT 
1 ro1e in the Arcadia project was? 
2 A. Here· ~gain, we have two. I assume 
3 you' re talking .about the latter one that Bui lo.· 
4 was under contract- with? 
5 
6 
7 
Q. 
A. 
I am, sir. 
.My role there was also as the 
resident engineer on that project during 
ff construction. 
9 Q. Were you, in addition to that role, 
10 project manager? 
11 
12 
:A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
.Was yQur- engineering stamp on the 
13 plans for the Arcadia project that we've .~ust 
14 been discussing? 
15 It is, along with our structural 
16 engineers who designed the structure. 
17 Q. When ciid you begin your role as the 
18 resident engineer for the Arcadia project? 
19 A. I think that particular date is 
20 probably on a contract in ZOOS. 
21 Q. Would that contract be between· the 
2·2 Department and Horrocks Engineering? 
2.3 MR. BRAITHWAITE: Obj_ection, calls 
24 for a legal cdnclu~ion. 
25 MR. FITTS: Join. 
Jenni•f er L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters In.c. 
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Dep·osi ti.<;m of .I{ex V:ernal. Harrison EX~INATI.ON BY MR. .TROUT 
i Exhibit 196? 
2 
~ 
A. 
Q. 
I believe that to be correct. 
I£ I. ~derstand your review of the 
4 project specifications, the contractor was 
5 al1o:wed to dispose of excavated material in 
6 waste areas along the roadway, as provided for 
7 
g· 
in plan note number 2, correct? 
A. Yes. 
9 (Deposition Exhibit 208 was ~arked 
10 for identification.) 
11 Q. Sir, ¥ou•ve been handed what's been 
12 marked as Exhibit 208 for identification. Do 
13 you have that document in front of you? 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18. 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
2-0 please? 
21 ·A. 
I do. 
·can you ~dentify 208 for us, pleas_e? 
Let me review it here a minute·. 
Certair:ily .. 
Okay. 
Can YQU. id~~tify Exhibit 208, 
Yes. Th1s is a letter to Pa·ul 
2.2 Adams, pro• ect manager for Build, :t·nc., J~nuary 
23 ~4,· 2008, referencing the final inspection and a 
24 punch list genercited on November 20, 2007; and 
25 additional items that were needed as identified 
Jennifer L_. Nazer R,PR, CSR 
Reporters In.c. 
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Oeposition of R.ex Vernal Harrison EXJ..MINATION BY MR •. TROUT 
1 Engineers• participation in the Legacy project, 
2 or what's known as the Legacy project, Segment 
3 3? 
4 A. I was aware that we were doing some 
5 de$ign with UDOT 6h that, yes-. 
6 
7 
Q. As part of preparing design with 
UDOT on Legacy Segment 3, were you aware that 
a· Horrocks Engineers, or employees of Horrocks, 
9 were reporting to someone by the name of Bethany 
10 Shingleton -at a company ca:Ll.ed HDR? 
11 A. t'm not aware of any of that, no. 
12 (Deposition Exhibit 222 was maiked 
13 for identification.) 
14 Q . Sir, you've been handed what's been 
. 15 marked as Exhibit 222 £or identification. I'd 
16 ask you to review that document and indicate to 
17 me when you are completed with your review. 
18 
19 
A. Yes. Exhibit 222 is a letter from 
mys~lf, Rex ·Harrisqn, to Paul Adams, referencing 
20 an error that. we found in the elevations that we 
21 had previously given the contra.ctor,. and a 
22 r~medy to correct. that, acpepting responsibility 
23 for that srror also. 
24 Q. And just so that we have a frame ·of 
25 reference, Exhibit 222 is a letter drafted by 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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Deposi tio.n of ~ex Vernal. Harriso_n EXAMINATION BY MR. .TROQT 
1 you, correct? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Dated March 15th, 2007, correct.? 
Correct. 
And it deals with the sloped bearing 
6 seats at the eight steel beveled plates welded 
7 tQ the bottom of ·the girder seats in abutments l 
s· and 3, correct? 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
It's my understanding that that -was 
il an error on behalf of Horrocks Engineers, 
12 correct? 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And it's my 1.lllderstanding· tha-t: 
15 Horro.cks Engineers :Paid ~e cost of correcting 
16 that· error,. correct? 
17- Cor:r;ect. 
18 (Deposition Exhibit 2·23 was marked 
19 f,o:t id.entification.) 
20 Q. Sir, you've been handed.what's been 
21 marked as Exhibit 223 for identification. When 
2.2 you!ve had a _chance to rev.1ew that, will you ·sQ 
23 signify and I'll ask. you a question or two~ 
24 A •. 
25 earlier? 
Did we no_t have this -similar .letter 
Jenni fer L_. Nazer RP~, _CSR 
Reporters In.c. 
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Deposition of Rex Ve~nal Harrison EX1'.MINATION BY MR. TROUT 
1 Q. I don't think so. I think there is 
2 a difference, sir. 
3 
4 
5 
A. Okay. 
Okay, yeah, it is different. 
Yes. This is a letter over my 
6 signature to Cameron Erickson, February 23rd, 
7 2009, transmitting pay estimate number 17 along 
8 with clarifications on some of the items. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Q. Would I be correct in understanding 
that you drafted ·this letter for transmittal on 
or about February 23, 2009? 
A. Cotr_ect. 
Q. And in the second full sentence of 
the first paragraph it says, quote, The current 
15 estimate number 17 is prepared based upon Build 
16 not accepting the proposed settlement offer of 
17 November 26, 2008, period, end quote. Did I 
18 read that correctly? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, you did. 
Would I be correct in understanding 
21 that with respect to item number 104, the fuel 
22 and asphalt cost adjustment, that it was your 
23 decision to back that out of pay estimate number 
24 17 when Bui1d did not accept the proposed 
25 settlement? 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
EXi~INATION B~ MR. .TROUT 
That is correct. 
And you made that decision as the 
3 resident engineer with respect to the Arcadia 
4 project; correct? 
5 A. In consultation with Robert Westover 
6 in UDOT, yes. 
7 .Q. So would I be corre.ct in 
g· understanding Mr . . Westover was advised anci 
9 concurred in .your decision?. 
10 
11 it .. 
12 
·A. 
Q. 
Yes. That's the way I uno.erstood 
Mr. a:~rrison, what did you cio to 
13' prepare for ·this deposition today? 
14 
is 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I got ~6dd sleep l~st rtight. 
Anything else? 
Not really, no. The fil~s are 
17 sc~ttered.. It would ~lmost b.e impos$ible to ·go 
18. back and do a lot of that research, but I don't 
19 even know where file$ Q.re. Th~y• re at UDOT. 
20 somewhere, but there's not a lot that I could 
21 re~llY look at. 
2.2 Q. °In preparation for this depos1t1on, 
23 did you have any meetings with Mr. Fitts or 
24 anyone from his organization prior to today? 
25 A. Just briefly this morning prior to 
Jenni.fer L.. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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Deposition of Rex Vernal Harrison EX~.MINATION BY MR. TROUT 
1 interpretation of contract drawings after the 
2 work is completed? 
3 MR. BRAITHWAI.TE: I'll just object. 
4 It assumes facts not in evidence, and incomplete 
5 hypothetical. 
6 
7 
$ 
9 
10 
MR. FITTS: I'll join, and calls for 
a legal conclusion. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
You can answer. 
I don't understand that question. 
All right. Let me break it down 
11 into subparts. And I'll ask it in the form of a 
12 hypothetical. 
13 If a contractor discovers that; on a 
14 UDOT project, the resident engineer made a 
15 mistake or error in the interpretation of the 
16 contract drawings arid specifications, and the 
17 contractor discovers that mistake or error after 
18 the work is complete, and the contractor 
19 incurred expense associated with that mistake or 
20 error by the resident engineer over and above 
21 that which the contractor contemplated he was 
22 going to expend in the performance of the work, 
23 what process, procedure, or portion of the 
24 Standard Specifications is the contractor 
25 supposed to fo·llow under that circumstance? 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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Depo!li ti.9n of P.-ex Verna+ Harrisc_n EXAMINATION BY MR. FITTS 
1 
2 previously. 
3 
4 
MR. FITTS: Same objections as 
t1R,. BRAITHWAITE: Join .. 
THE WITNESS: The process he would 
5 follow would be the one that was initiated with 
6 auild on this project, and that is to escalate 
7 and ask for a claims review at the regional 
8 level. 
9 MR. TROUT: All right, sir. Those 
10 are the questions I have. Thank you very much 
11 for your attention today, sir. 
12 THE WITNESS: Qkay. 
13 (Deposition Exhibit 224 was marked 
14 for identification.) 
15 EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. FITTS: 
17 Q. Rex, 1et me hand you what's been 
18 marked as Exhibit 224. Is that a document that 
19 you recognize? 
20 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it's one I recognize. 
Do you know what it is'? 
It's a cooperative agreement b~tween 
23 UDOT and Duchesne County for the construction of 
24 the Arcadia Road. 
25 (Deposition Exhibit 225 was marked 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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Deposition of Rex Vernal Harrison EXJ1.MINATION BY MR. FITTS 
1 THE WITNESS: That would be the 
2 earthwork foreman at the time. I think it was 
3 both Cameron and Paul at the time that were out 
4 there. Myself and Lavon had looked at places 
5 where they could possibly waste some additional 
6 material. 
7 
8 
Q. 
A. 
Within the project right of way? 
Within the project right-of-way, and 
9 places where we couldn't accept any more 
10 material, be wasted. Either it would impede 
11 drainage or add additional weight on slopes' 
12 stabilities that were already moving. 
13 MR. TROUT: I'm going to place an 
14 objection on the record to the entire answer by 
15 the witness, and tie it to my original objection 
16 to the lack ·o.f foundation and objection to form. 
17 Q. Did you exercise engineering 
18 judgment in evaluating whether or not additional 
19 material could be placed within the project 
20 right-of-way? 
21 MR. TROUT: Object to the form, lack 
22 of foundation. 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, my personal 
24 engineering judgment along with our geotechnical 
25 recommendations that we were· aware of subsurface 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
Reporters Inc. 
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Deposii:i.e,n of llex Vernal Harrison EXi.MINATION Br MR. FITTS 
1 movement in that particular slide area. So yes, 
2 that was part .of the engineering judgment that 
3 went into the· determination,~ .. 
4 Q. Were slope stability issues part of 
5 that analysis you made? 
6 MR. TROUT: Object to the form, lack 
7 of foundation. 
iHE WIT~ESS: fes. 
Q. Is that what you were referring to 
10 when you talked about additional weight being 
11 placed on some of the slopes? 
12 MR. TROUT: Object to the form_, lack 
13 of foundation. 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. There's 
15 certainly, in $lides as we had there, that's 
16 pretty major soil failure· movement areas 
17 identified by our geotech. We tried to 
18 
19 
20 
21 
stabilize 
design of 
weight on 
stabilize 
it, 
the 
the 
the 
and the 
project 
toe down 
movement 
recommendation in the 
was we would add more 
next to the bridge to 
of the soil above it, 
2.2 which seems to have worked, basically, as 
23 planned, looking at it with history now. But we 
24 were concerned about adding additional weight on 
25 top of those particular failure planes. 
Jennifer L. Nazer RPR, CSR 
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., l Pr oject No: STP-1544( 1 )5 Change Order #: 3 
locatlon: ARCADIA ROAD Charge ID No.: 50162 
Name: BUILD INCORPORATED Contract Date: 7/12/2005 
Description: APPROACH SLAB #2 MODIFICATION PIN: 000616 
Code Tlmo Extension Contract Monies Allocated To Date(lnformation Only) 
Group I Alpha I Originator WORKING Original Contract I COs to Dato ICurrenl Contract Amount (Includes COs to date 
·3. 1 G I 1 5 $2,676,511 .65 I $34,870.75 I $2,711,382.40 
·• I BASIS OF PAYMENT. l9ngmal Contract Unit, Agreed Unit 
ITEM ESTIMATED QTY. UNrT OF AMOUNT . 
tNCREASE/DESCREASE MEASUREM_Ef:'JT 
UNIT 
PRICE i NCREASE/DECREASE 
• tndicates an ltem··with a dbe commitment change with a non-zero goal. 
- Indicates a dbe commitment chan e with a zero cal. 
rcsentatlve: 
TiUe:._~<~~""·~:1 ... ,k_~C",>r-1-<l .... tf-:<:---
,Date: >"f1 q { 07_ · 
P~OJECT MANAGER 
· Region Contracts_ Spoclallst: 
pate: 
horlze~ Representative: 
DI.STRICT ENGINEER 
{\-pprove(j Spcciflc:aUon Change 
(Stewardship) 
Each . 
lb· 
·cu 'd. 
Lump 
$364.5 
$7,684.5~ 
$3.~45.3 
$7,684.sg 
TOTA L NET CHANGES (DoITar) = I $13,039:6§ 
RESIDENT ENGINEEf{Check One) 
Rc~omm~ndcd for ApproVa! 
Date: 
. REG. DIRECTOR/PROJECT MANA.GER 
APPROVED FOR UDOT 
>$25,000 
7 -f). · 07 Recommend Specification Change 
Dale: for Approval (Non-Stewardship) 
Recommended for Approval: 
~-
µ ~~/4/<7 
Date: Date: Dale: 
()1 STE.WARDSHIP. 0 NON-STEWARDSHIP(Check One) NOTE: Non-Stewardship approvlng for Division Administrator. Stewardship approving for 
Engineer for Construction. 
Approved for Federal Participation OMMENTS (Non-Participation): 
Dale~ 
JUN 2· b ?UU/ 
CONST.ORG.3755 
Page 1 of 1 Page 
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ATTACHMENT A Form C-101 Rev. 03/05 
TO CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT CHANGE ORDER NO. 3 
PROJECT NUMBER: STP-1544(1)5 
"LOCATION: ARCADIA ROAD: 
LETTER OF EXPLANATION 
REASONS FOR-CHANGE ORDER: 
The roadway to the North of app~oach slab #2 is constructed. an an unstable historic land slide. The projec:t 
design undertoof{ measures· to· ·Improve i~ ~tability per G~CJtechn.ical Engineer~ r~commedatic>ns. Durh1g 
the one year monitoring of the roacfway excavatior.t and embankm~nt, the project G~otechnical En·gil'.lee(_believ~s. 
tfl:e olp lari~ slide may still be.moving_. The corrective a.c~lon und~rtook by the project d~igner wm 
take some time to stabjlii~ the sltde. The Structurat Desiijner has developed a modification to the approach 
slab that will functlon as· a moviable joint that will allow visual' monitoring of'lhe 3-inch glanded joint. 
The joint wiU allow movement f;i the earth towards the concrete bridge stn,Jcture without lnd_uclng l_r1tte_ral 
loads-on the structure, while providing for visual lnsp~ction 9f pote.ntial movement as the joint clos:es. 
PROJECT ENGINEER'S CC>$T ANALYSIS:· 
The Engineers independent cosla~alysis for changes proposed under this Change.Order amountect·to $14,49J.00, 
See attach~d ~ngineers E~timate dated 1/18/07 
CONTRACT TIME A_DJUSTMENT: 
TJi~ ·Engineer h~s r~viewed the Contractor CPM schedule arid finds the add~d work will hnpact the original 
work"plan. Based. on the Engineers analysis, Si additional Working Days are jt..t$Ufied to complete forming, 
placing added°'reJnforcing steel, ~cbeduling the unique joint and void f9rrn deliver1¢5 ~nd concr~t~ placemen~ 
COORDINATED. WtTH: 
Duchesne County Public Works· 
Duc:h~sne_ Coun~y Commission 
UDOT Structures Division 
UDOT Project Manager 
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i\.\W,r..:~C.~5 ~r, 
November 25. 2008 
HORROCKS 
:.::--~ .. ~~...-i;:::- lfall r:~=.::-'S:1;-----0·-
1; ~ ( i I r-... I t I { ~ 
Mr~ Cameron Erickson. Project Man~gor 
Build. Inc. 
51 QO West .700 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84 104_ 
SUBJECT: Project No. STP-.1544(1)5 
Duchesne County Arcadia Road 
Earthwork Claim Settlement 
Dear Mr. Cameron: 
Ti:: a:iH~ ~ :ix. 
-S¼II _a,~ 1t1~ ~ ; ;.,s 
;::,:. iJ·, 7~~ -=-~01 
ir.Sl:s:~ :t!• ft#= ~::,,~~ I~.:.: 
\ 
This letter acknowledges the Claim of Build, Inc. tf1at was elevated to UOOT Region 3 for r.eview 
and negotiation in accordance wiU, uoors escalation policy. Two negotiation meetings were held 
with UOOT Region .3 Construction Staff. Duchesne County, Horrocks Engineers and Build. Inc. on 
October 7" and 281'\of this year. Consideration ol the evolution of this claim. its late deveropmen.1 
after the projec;t work was compieted and cqmptiance wit_h conu-act pl?!'\S and specifications hava 
resulted in an oppqriunity fot a fa,r and equitable settlement. 
A cnanged condition is acknowledged as the basis of the claim, in that 13.512 cubic yards of 
surplus roadyray excavation couJd no longer ba effectively disposed of within the contract limits. 
BuildTs _most fesent claim totals to an amount of 5389,593.81 as subrnilted at our last meeting of 
the 2a••• of October. Psrties recognize that mismanagement oi the Contractor's work contno.uted to 
excessive- cost incurred by the BuUd, Inc. 
A finding for somcment and rosolutio·n of this claim in its entireiy is hereby pff ered to Build. Inc. a$ 
fotlows: . 
11 Considaratron or payment will be based on the agreed 2,330 hours or trucking un~e as 
recorded u1 the Field Engineer"s aia. ry (diary copies attached},•~ lieu of the 2.~94 hours 
claimed by Build. lnc., computed at tho claim rate of S110.00,'hbur. See attached 
modific·atioo to Build·s claim amounting to an adjusted offer of S211,350.00. 
2) Thisproposa1 recogri'izes Build's lack of tm,ely notice of Work beyond origcnal scope and 
without n_otice to the Engineer/Owner as required by the Contract Section 00725 •. places 
liability on B:uildt inc. Because of. tlio lack of nQtice, we Un.d thai Build has to sh~re · 
some of the responsibility for of employing a more expensive resolution of dispqsing of 
the excess excavation ma:enaL Further, Build did not extend the Owne, an opportunity 
of concurrence of more economical alternatives. The Owner and its agents have also 
incurred direct and overhead costs clue to the late completion of this contract work. 
Therefor!. no payment is offered for BuUd's overhead. or prom portions of the claim. 
~) lmerest charg_es would only t:>e c:tue. if there was protracted paynlent cf a noh di!;putabie 
expense that the Owner had not pafd promptly. This ciarm sattleme,it becomes due 
EXHIBIT 
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and payable once approved by all parties. Therefore. to interest payment is offered on 
this ctatm. 
4) Contract Time will be increased by 25 working days to compensate tot this out.of scope 
work aclivity. 
5) Roversalof the liquidaied damages amounting to S52.839.50 writ be included in the 
settlement 
6) A Fuel Cost Adjustment for lhe work beyond previous contract time will be included in 
the settfemen~. amounting to S9.283.80. (See attached form C-300) 
7) A Bituminou~ Cost Adjustment f9t work beyond previous contract time win be inciuded 
in the settlement. amounting. to S34.452.25, (S~e attclchep for c .. 302) 
s) Item No. 78 wlff be paid based on our copies of re~eived ~eight tickels. Another 419.63·· 
too of materiai will be included for payment on Estimate No.: 17. The totaf quantity of 
payment on this item is 1,171.40 ton. amounting to SS32.799.20. 
A revised Paymf;nl Estimate No. t 7 will be compned upon ac9eptance of the above settlemen1 
offer~ The attach¢d spread ~fleet summarizes the proposed setUement of .the sut;>jec.l claim in ns 
entirety\ and is submitte_d for y9or accept~n~.~ ~s a final and.best offer., Wa reque$t your w.rttren: 
deci~ion within te.n (10) days to enable ihs tirnf:ly close out of the projecl within the n~~t 30 days~ 
Sincerely. 
t-J9AR0CKS rGINl;ERS 
~~···;. V /, . 
. l (~.LJJl.~-,. . 
Rex . Harrison. P £ 
Project Manager 
Attachment 
PC: Glen Murphy. Duchesne County Public Works 
W.R. .Hamson. D~chesne. t;:ounty Conu1~ssic11. Chairman 
Bill Townsend. UOOT Region 3 Prgiect Manager 
Bob Wastover. UDOT Region 3 D1stricl Engfrieer 
Steve Slade~ BIA. WRO Construction Engineer 
Pro1ec1 Fill 
003531 
AR_02 l 024 ~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
